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This thesis consists of three different essays-organized as different chapters-that deal with 
empirical as well as theoretical aspects of the economics of retirement. The first essay contributes 
to the theoretical life-cycle literature by analyzing in depth the role of retirement date expectations 
in determining saving behavior. As our main contribution, we demonstrate that the magnitude of the 
reaction of consumption and saving behavior of younger individuals to a change in the retirement date 
is largely determined by the degree to which utility is additively separable in consumption and leisure. 
The second essay is an econometric study that uses data from the US Health and Retirement Study to 
investigate whether Americans do, in fact, alter their saving behavior in response to changing retirement 
date expectations. Our obtained point estimates suggest that the responsiveness of households' saving 
behavior to retirement dates expectations is large. Finally, the third essay contributes to the literature 
on the formation and rationality of retirement expectations, with particular emphasis on the role of 
focal point responses. In this essay, we argue that the increased tendency with age to give a focal 
point answer of probability one to the question regarding the probability of working full time after age 
62, is the primary cause for the failure of this subjective probability to converge to the corresponding 
objective probability over time. As our main contribution, we offer a novel interpretation of focal point 
responses in terms of ambiguous beliefs dynamics that arise in new developments of decision theory 
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In the context of the life-cycle theory of consumption and saving, the most im-
portant parameter governing individuals' saving decisions is the expected length of 
retirement. This, in tum, is governed by two factors: First, the expected age of death; 
and second, the expected age of retirement. A later retirement age will, ceteris paribus, 
shorten the retirement horizon resulting in less of a need to save in younger years in 
order to maintain consumption levels in the years of retirement. In many developed 
countries, younger workers today can expect to retire later than their older counter-
parts.' This comes after a lengthy period, through the 1900's, up until the late 1980's, 
of a decl ining trend in the age of retirement. 
The observed upward trend in the average retirement age can be attributed-to 
some extent-to government policies induced both by the aging of the baby boomers 
and by greater longevity in general. The aging of the baby boomers, together with in-
creased longevity and lower birth rates, has significantly increased dependency ratios, 
rendering or threatening to render public pensions insolvent. For instance, the US gov-
ernment already reacted to these trends in 1983 through social security amendments 
that increased the Normal Retirement Age2 from 65 for those born before 1938, in-
creasing in two month increments for those born every year thereafter, reaching age 
67 for those born in 1960. These amendments also increased the Delayed Retirement 
, See appendix A for a more detailed discussion on historical and projected trends in labor force 
participation rates of older individuals in the United States. 












Credit, which rewards the delaying of retirement past Normal Retirement Age until 
age 70. To see that such retirement age increases may bear a huge potential for politi-
cal and social conflict, just take France's 2010 increase in the Normal Retirement Age 
from 65 to 67, which has been met with much opposition by the French population, 
culminating in highly publicized strikes and violent protests. 
While there appears to be a strong trend towards later retirement for the years 
to come, we also have a much spoken about global "savings crisis", i.e., a situation 
in which households saving rates are at dangerously low levels. For example, the US 
household saving rates in 2008 were at their lowest level in over 70 years3 • Our propo-
sition in this thesis is that while later retirement dates might serve to avert a pension 
crisis, they may at the same time exacerbate the private savings crisis. Thus, while the 
positive effects oflater retirement dates might be well known, both in terms of decreas-
ing dependency ratios, and in terms of increasing the labor capacity of the economy, 
there is also an adverse effect oflater retirement on household savings caused by the in-
dividuals' consumption-smoothing behavior. This adverse effect oflater retirement on 
household savings, and therefore on the capital-labour ratio, productivity and growth 
in the economy, has been so far mentioned in the literature only in passing (cf., e.g., 
Kotlikoff et aI., 200 I; Fougere et aI., 2005). 













While Pingle (2006) and Mastrobuoni (2009) illustrate the importance of factors 
such as increases in the Delayed Retirement Credit and Normal Retirement Age re-
spectively in increasing labor force participation rates of older workers, authors such 
as Blau and Goodstein (2010) show that these factors can account for only one quarter 
to one half of the trend in these rates. Since Mastroubini's model estimates "treat-
ment effects", it is likely that changes in the Normal Retirement Age operate through 
non-economic channels such as changing social norms. Blau and Goodstein suggest 
that increasing labor force participation rates of older individuals is a result of changes 
in the composition of the older male population, away from high school dropouts and 
toward college graduates. Other factors cited by authors as influencing the increas-
ing labor force participation of older individuals include the movement away from 
defined-benefit pension plans, which tend to incentivize early retirement, to defined 
contribution plans which are more age neutral. There is also a declining percentage 
of employers who offer retirees health insurance, and so employees may choose to re-
main employed u til they are eligible for medicare. Schirle (2008) found that about 
one quarter of the increase in older male participation could be accounted for by the 
growth in the participation of older wives, since to a large extent working husbands 
and wives tend to retire at the same time. 
Thus, while the factors contributing to later retirement dates are numerous, gov-












adverse effects on household saving behavior. While increased longevity on its own 
would have served to increase the savings of the young by lengthening their expected 
retirement horizons, increasing the age of retirement mitigates this effect. In light of 
this implication of later retirement, this thesis aims to analyze in greater depth the re-
lationship between expected retirement dates and the saving behavior of the young. 
While it should be clear that certain factors contributing to later retirement are endoge-
nous4 to saving behavior, we expect that the anticipation of the later retirement date 
itself should also have a direct effect on pre-retirement saving behavior. It is mainly 
this direct effect that concerns us in this thesis. At the same time, we are also inter-
ested in the question of how individuals form such retirement date expectations. Since 
such expectations determine saving behavior, it is desirable to understand how these 
expectations evolve over time, and more so, how rational this process is. The accu-
racy of these expectations directly impacts an individual's ability to correctly asses the 
amount he will need to save for retirement. 
We now proceed to give a brief summary of the contributions of each of the three 
chapters comprising this thesis. 
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Chapter 1 
Chapter 1 conducts a partial equilibrium analysis in which we theoretically analyze 
the direct effect of changing retirement dates on the consumption and saving behav-
ior of younger individuals. Standard life-cycle models of saving (cf., Modigliani and 
Bromberg, 1954; Friedman ,1957) presume that individuals receive utility from con-
sumption only. As a consequence, later retirement dates, and hence greater lifetime 
income, in these models will always lead to greater lifetime consumption of individ-
uals, implying for utility maximizers greater consumption in every time period. The 
implication would be a reduction in savings at earlier stages of the life-cycle. Under 
the more realistic assumption, however, that an individual's utility is affected by con-
sumption as well as leisure, the impact of a change in the retirement date is not as 
straightforward. 
In this chapter, we study the effects of changes in retirement dates on pre-
retirement consumption and saving behavior under the assumption that utility is a 
function of both consumption and leisure. As our main contribution, we demonstrate 
that the magnitude of the reaction of consumption and saving to a change in the retire-
ment date is largely determined by the degree to which utility is additively separable 
in consumption and leisure. 
As a first result, we show that while consumption of younger individuals in-












in the case where utility is seen to be non-separable in consumption and leisure, and 
the cross-derivative of the utility function is negative, than in the case where they are 
separable. That is, for separable preferences our model implies an increase in con-
sumption of younger age groups for later retirement dates analogous to the findings 
in standard models where utility is derived from consumption only. The situation is 
different, however, if preferences are non-separable in consumption and leisure. Key 
to our finding is that if preferences are non separable in consumption and leisure, and 
the cross-derivative of the utility function is negative, then the positive effect on con-
sumption behavior of an increase in lifetime resources-induced by a later anticipated 
retirement date-is dampened by a negative effect on consumption caused by a de-
crease in the path of future leisure. 
As a second result we show that while younger individuals save less in response 
to a later anticipated retirement date, the relative decrease in saving is larger when 
preferences are non-separable in consumption and leisure (and the cross-derivative of 
the utility function is negative) than when preferences are separable. This finding is 
particularly relevant because empirical evidence5 supports the notion that preferences 
are non-separable in consumption and leisure, and more specifically, that the cross-
derivative of the utility function is in fact negative. 













In Chapter 2 we use data from the US Health and Retirement Study (HRS) to empir-
ically verify whether Americans do, in fact, alter their saving behavior in response to 
changing retirement date expectations. Whether or not individuals take cognizance of 
their expected retirement date in saving decisions has implications for how recent and 
expected future trends towards later retirement in the United States will affect saving 
rates in the economy. In conducting our analysis we use data from seven waves of the 
Health and Retirement study, which is a nationally representative study of the elderly 
population in the United States. In particular, we look at the effect of the subjective 
probability-as reported in the HRS data--ofworking full time after age 62 (p62)6 on 
wealth accumulation. 
Central to our analysis is the issue of endogeneity between retirement date de-
cisions and wealth. Two main difficulties arise in conducting our empirical analysis. 
Firstly, in cross-sectional analysis it is not possible to control for unobserved hetero-
geneity such as tastes, which might affect both the timing of retirement and wealth 
accumulation. The second issue is the direct endogeneity between retirement date 
expectations/decisions and wealth. While expectations regarding the timing of retire-
ment are likely to have a direct effect on wealth accumulation prior to retirement, pre 
6 Age 62 is the early retirement age in the US. It is the earliest age at which individuals are eligible 
to receive social security retirement benefits, even though these benefits are permanently reduced. See 












retirement wealth is also likely to have an effect on retirement decisions. We attempt 
to correct for these problems as follows. In using panel data, we are able to conduct 
Fixed Effects regression analysis, which allows us to control for unobserved hetero-
geneity across individuals that might affect both wealth accumulation and retirement 
date decisions. We further attempt to correct for the direct endogeneity problem (be-
tween wealth and retirement expectations) by using Instrumental Variables estimation. 
We thus conduct an Instrumental Variables Fixed Effects Regression to analyze the 
effect of exogenous variation in p62 on wealth accumulation. To this end we use re-
spondents' self reported responses regarding the usual retirement age in the job that 
the respondent is currently working in, as an instrument for the probability of working 
full time after age 62. The instrumental variable approach has the added advantage of 
dealing with measurement error and focal point responses (answers centred around 0, 
50 or 100) that tend to plague subjective probability responses. 
Similar to our approach is Bloom et al. (2007) who use the health and retire-
ment study (HRS) to look at the effect of subjective survival probabilities on wealth 
accumulation decisions in the United States. Bloom et al find that an increase in the 
subjective probability of living to age 75 increases household wealth amongst couples 
only. Whether individuals respond to variation in SUbjective retirement expectations in 












ter to be determined empirically. To date, there are no studies that include subjective 
retirement probabilities in wealth regressions. 
On a whole, the point estimates suggest that the responsiveness of households' 
saving behavior to retirement dates expectations is large. A ten percentage point in-
crease in the household subjective probability of working past age 62 results in a de-
crease in household wealth well in excess of 20% for most demographic groups. We 
are most confident in this result for single women households, in which case the stan-
dard errors are small. We also find that, in the case of married couples in particular, 
there is a threshold effect in this response. 
Chapter 3 
Since individuals do not know their retirement date with certainty, they rely on their 
expectation about their retirement date in making life-cycle decisions. Thus, rationality 
of the process that leads to the formation of such expectations is crucial whenever 
individuals are to make correct saving decisions. In Chapter 3 we look at the rationality 
of individuals retirement date expectations by analyzing more closely the subjective 
probability of working past age 62. Our contribution in this chapter relates not only 
to the analysis of the data itself, but also to the decision-theoretic foundations of the 












As a first finding, we show that-with the exception of married men-the subjec-
tive probability of working past age 62 fails to converge to the corresponding objective 
probability as individuals approach age 62. In particular, there is an upward bias that 
is non-decreasing over time-an observation which represents an apparent violation 
of the Rational Bayesian Learning paradigm. Secondly, we show that there is an in-
creased tendency at older ages to give a focal point response of 100 to the question 
regarding the probability of working full time after age 62. Moreover, we show that 
this phenomenon is the primary cause of the failure of the subjective probability of 
working past age 62 to converge to the corresponding objective (additive) probability 
overtime. 
More specifically, our analysis establishes that there are two different kinds of 
focal point responses given close to the event in question: Those that are more or less 
accurate, and those that are not. We show that focal point responses given consistently 
over the questioning horizon are quite accurate, while focal point responses given only 
closer to the event in question are biased. 
These features of the data provide us with a new interpretation of focal point re-
sponses of 100 and zero that arise from precise responses. In particular, a focal point 
response of 100 or 0, can be represented by a neD-additive capacity --cf., Chateauneuf 
et al. (2007). A neo-additive capacity is a non-additive belief that represents a devi-












confidence the agent has in some additive probability distribution. As this belief is 
updated over time according to the Generalized Bayesian Update Rule, the degree of 
ambiguity increases, in that the agent has decreasing confidence in the additive prob-
ability distribution. In our context, the agent, then, resolves this ambiguity by having 
complete confidence in the extreme belief that he/she will, or will not, with absolute 













Retirement Date Effects on Consumption 
and Saving Behavior: The Case of 
Non-Separable Preferences in 
Consumption and Leisure 
1.1 Introduction 
Labor force participation rates of older individuals in many OECD countries have 
been increasing since the late 1990's. For example, for US males in the age group 
between 65 and 69 labor force participation rates had reached levels of about 33% in 
March 2008, after having been at a low of24% in 1985 and 27% in 1995. Similarly, 
labor force participation rates for US females were 27% in 2008 compared to 17% in 
1995. Resulting from a gradual increase in the Normal retirement age, in combina-
tion with other factors, these trends in the US are expected to continue for sometime 
into the future. An important policy issue relates to the implication of these later 
retirement dates for wealth accumulation over the life-cycle, and hence aggregate 
saving rates in the economy. Saving rates are important in that they influence the ac-
cumulation of capital, and hence growth in the economy. Standard life-cycle models 












als receive utility from consumption only. As a consequence, later retirement dates, 
and hence greater lifetime income, in these models will always lead to greater life-
time consumption of individuals, and for utility maximizers, greater consumption in 
every time period. The implication would be a reduction in savings at earlier stages 
ofthe life-cycle. Under the more realistic assumption, however, that an individual's 
utility is affected by consumption as well as leisure, the impact of a change in the 
retirement date is not as straightforward. 
In this chapter, we study the effects of changes in retirement date on pre-
retirement consumption and saving behavior under the assumption that utility is a 
function of both consumption and leisure. As our main contribution, we demon-
strate that the magnitude of the reaction of consumption and saving to a change in 
the retirement date is largely determined by the degree to which utility is additively 
separable in consumption and leisure. 
Starting with Heckman (1974), many authors have suggested that preferences 
are non-separable in consumption and leisure. The testing of separability between 
consumption and leisure was first addressed by authors such as Jorgenson and Lau 
(1975), Ghez and Becker (1975), Abbot and Ashenfelter (1976, 1979), Blackorby et 
al. (1978), Barnett (1979, 1981), Atkinson et al. (1981), Deaton (1982), Browning et 
al. (1985), Murphy and Thom (1987), Browning and Meghir (1989), Kaiser (1993), 
and more recently by authors such as Basu and Kimball (2002), Ham and Reilly 












and Kiley (2007). All these studies conclude that preferences are non-separable in 
consumption and leisure, and in particular, that the marginal utility of consumption 
is negatively related to leisure. Given this empirical evidence, it is thus fitting that 
we analyze the effect of changing retirement dates in the case where preferences are 
non-separable in consumption and leisure. 
As a first result, we show that while consumption of younger individuals in-
creases in response to later retirement, the relative increase in consumption is smaller 
in the case where preferences are seen to be non-separable in consumption and 
leisure, and in particular when the cross-derivative of the utility function is nega-
tive, than in the case where they are separable. That is, for separable preferences our 
model implies an increase in consumption of younger age groups for later retirement 
dates analogous to the findings in standard models where utility is derived from con-
sumption only. The situation is different, however, if preferences in consumption and 
leisure are non-separable. Key to our finding is that if preferences are non separa-
ble in consumption and leisure, and if the marginal utility of consumption is nega-
tively related to leisure, the positive effect on consumption behavior of an increase 
in lifetime resources induced by a later anticipated retirement date, is dampened by 
a negative effect on consumption caused by a decrease in the path of future leisure. 
More specifically, if preferences are non-separable in consumption and leisure, the 
effect of a change in the retirement date can no longer be viewed as the same as that 












retirement, an expected, say, capital gain or inheritance is not accompanied by a de-
crease in leisure. An increase in lifetime resources due to a later retirement date is, 
however, accompanied by a decrease in expected retirement leisure. We show that 
this nuance is not significant for preferences that are separable in consumption and 
leisure, and a change in the expected date of retirement will induce changes in con-
sumption analogous to the case where utility is considered a function of consumption 
alone. If, however, preferences are non-separable in consumption and leisure, then 
our model shows that this nuance changes the analysis in a non-trivial manner. 
As a second result we show that while younger individuals save less in response 
to a later anticipated retirement date, the relative decrease in saving is larger when 
preferences are non-separable in consumption and leisure, and the cross-derivative of 
the utility function is negative, than when preferences are separable. 
While authors such as Heckman (1974), and more recently French (2005) and 
Hurd and Rohwedder (2005), have cited non-separable preferences as a possible ex-
planation for the drop in consumption at retirement, our paper explicitly models the 
optimal consumption path under non-separable preferences, and then shows the effect 
of variation in the retirement date on pre-retirement consumption/saving behavior. 
We proceed with this chapter as follows. In section 1.2 we start offwith a model 
in which utility is an additively separable function of consumption and leisure. We 
show the response of consumption to a postponement in the anticipated retirement 












sumption and leisure, and show how the response of agents' consumption decisions 
differ from the separable case. Section 1.4 models the response of saving to a change 
in the retirement date, and shows how the response differs under separable and non-
separable preferences. In section 1.5 we provide simulations to show how consump-
tion and saving responses differ under the two different preference structures. We 
conclude in section 1.6. 
1.2 Separable preferences in consumption and leisure 
We consider a deterministic model in which we have a rational agent whose aim is 
to maximize lifetime utility. We assume the agent lives till (and including) period 
T. Within this period he will spend a certain amount of time working full time and 
the rest of the time in retirement, during which time he will live off savings accu-
mulated during his working years and social security (and/or pension) income. We 
assume that in order to maintain his lifestyle post retirement, savings are necessary 
to supplement social security/pension income. Assuming that the agent does not 
face any liquidity constraints in that he is able to borrow against future income, we 
now proceed to analyze the effect of variation in the anticipated retirement date on 
pre-retirement consumption/saving decisions. 
The agent's instantaneous utility at time t is given by it = [u(c(t)) + v(l(t))J, 













rived from leisure. We define leisure, It, to be 1 before retirement, and equal to I> 1 
every period after retirement. 
Implicit in this specification is the assumption that preferences are separable in 
consumption and leisure. We further assume time separability. We also assume that 
the retirement date is determined exogenously to the model. 
For a given anticipated date of retirement, tret, (and hence a given v(I(t)) in 
every period), the agent's aim at time t is to maximize utility as follows: 
(1.1) 
where f3 is the discount factor = l!P' where, p, is the rate oftir:~_ preference. 
The dynamic budget constraint at any time t is given by: 
Xt+! = (Xt - Ct) . R + Yt+l (1.2) 
Xt = at + Yt (1.3) 
where Xt is "cash on hand", R is the fixed gross return on assets, and is equal 
to (1 + r), where r is the interest rate common to borrowing and lending, and Yt is 
non-capital income. We further assume that 
{
It ift < tRet 












where It is labor income, and it is social security/pension income. We assume 
Human capital wealth, ht, is given by 
~ R-(k-t) _ ht+1 + Yt+l 
~ Yk - ---------
k=t+l R 
tRet-1 T L I R-(k-t) + L iR-(k-t) for t < tRet (1.5) 
k=t+ 1 k=tRe t 
and is clearly the sum of total discounted non-capital income. 
Finally 
(1.6) 
where Wt is total wealth at time t, and evolves according to the following equa-
tion: 





7 This assumption is certainly valid in the context ofthe US, as well as most other developed coun-













That is, the present value of all future consumption must equal total wealth, 
and further, the binding constraint in equation 1.8 and terminal condition given by 
equation 1.9 imply that all wealth must be consumed by the time the agent dies. For 
the purpose of this model, we abstract from the bequest motive and assume that the 
agent does not intend to leave any bequests. 
Observation 1: Wt is a strictly increasing/unction 0/ tret. 
Table 1.1 shows human capital wealth for different anticipated retirement dates. 
Clearly, an earlier retirement date results in less human capital wealth, and hence less 
total wealth, Wt. 
RETIREMENT DATE, tret HUMAN CAPITAL WEALTH AT TIME T 
T 
t+l L i·R-(k-t) 
k=t+l 
T 
t+2 I. R-1 + L i. R-(k-t) 
k=t+2 
t+2 T 




T L I. R-(k-t) 
k=t+l 
Table 1.1: Retirement Date Dependent Human Capital Wealth from the perspective 
oft < tret 
In particular, the change in human capital as a result of increasing the retirement 













Thus, delaying the date of retirement allows the agent to substitute labor in-
come for social security income between t~et and t;et' increasing human capital 
wealth8 • 
Writing the utility maximization problem, from the perspective of any time 
period, t, as a standard dynamic programming problem, we have 
T 
max Lj3k-t(U(Ck)) 
(Ct •.. CT) k=t 




where J (at, I, i, tret ) is the value function, which depends on assets, at, pre 
retirement income, I, post retirement social security/pension income, i, and the date 
of retirement, tret. The first order conditions pertaining to consumption for the above 
maximization problem, conditioned on the budget constraint result in the following: 
(1.12) 
(1.13) 
8 We assume that it is independent of the retirement date. This holds in the case where the increase 
in the retirement age is as a result of an increase in the Normal Retirement Age. If the Retirement 
age increased due to another factor, than it might increase with an increase in tret , in which case the 












Let us assume that the fonn of the utility function is of standard constant rela-
tive risk aversion (eRRA) fonn, 
(1.14) 
with () i- 1. Now () reflects the curvature/concavity of the utility function with 
a higher value of () reflecting a more concave utility function. ~ reflects the intertem-
poral elasticity of substitution. 
Now, 
(1.15) 
and from 1.13 
(~)-o = f3R Ct+1 (1.16) 
(~) = [f3Rr! Ct+1 (1.17) 



















Ct = Ct+l = ... = CT (1.20) 
If, however, the rate of time preference is greater than the rate of return, con-
sumption will tend to decrease over time. On the other hand, if the rate of return 
is greater than the rate of time preference, consumption will tend to increase over 
time. These effects, however, tend to be dampened, the more concave the utility 
function, i.e., the lower the intertemporal elasticity of substitution of the consumer. 
We illustrate in the following manner: We know from equations 1.18 and 1.19 that 
1 1 
Ct ----t Ct+1 ----t .... ----t CT if [,BRr e ----t 1. Now [,BRr e ----t 1 if [,BRJ ----t 1, or 
if - ~ ----t 0 (::::} e ----t (0). Thus, the more concave the utility function (the lower 
the intertemporal elasticity of substitution), the more an agent will tend to smooth 
consumption across time periods. 
Proposition 1.1 When preferences are separable in consumption and leisure, 
our solution for consumption in any time period t can be given as: 
Ct= T-t . 
'£ (,BR)~ . RT-t-j 
j=O 
. Wt (1.21) 
with the marginal propensity to consume out of total wealth equal to (T-t RT-t ) 
L: (j3R)~·RT-t-j 
j=O 
Proof: See appendix to Chapter 1 .• 












lnCt= In T-t . 
L: ((3R)~ . RT-t-j 
j=O 
+lnWt 
~In (T_t RT - t ) 






gives the relative change in consumption for a unit change in the retirement 
date. 




) is constant with respect to t ret ) we have the 




~In Ct ~In Wt 
~tret ~tret 
(1.24) 
That is, when preferences are separable in consumption and leisure, the relative 
change in consumption at time t with respect to a unit change in the anticipated 
retirement date, is equal to the relative change in total wealth at time t for a unit 












1.3 Non-separable preferences in consumption and leisure 
So far we have restricted our utility function to being additively separable in con-
sumption and leisure. If we relax this assumption, and instead assume that prefer-
ences are non-separable in consumption and leisure, then the optimal consumption 
path does not necessarily involve consumption smoothing over time. To show this, 
assume the same budget and leisure constraints as in the separable case, but now 
assume that instantaneous utility at time t is given by the following cobb douglas 
isoelastic utility function:9 
u(c, l) 
(1.25) 
where 0 < 'T} < 1, and represents the share of consumption in utility (of course 
1 - 'T} represents the share of leisure in utility), and () i= 110 will influence whether 
the cross-derivative of the utility function is positive or negative, with ~ being the 
intratemporal elasticity of substitution between consumption and leisure. 
Now, 
9 Examples of authors who have used such a utility function are: French (2005), Hurd and Rohwed-
der (2003), Low (2005), and Laitner and Silverman (2005). 
10 If () = 1, then the function reduces to a log utility function which is additively separable in con-












1](1-0)-1 (1 )(1-1])(1-0) 
"let t (1.26) 
and 
Ucl = (1 - 0)(1 - "l)4(1-0)-11~1-0)(1-1])-1 (1.27) 
If 0 > 1 (~ < 1), then Ucl < 0, i.e. the marginal utility of consumption decreases 
as leisure increases. Since marginal utility of consumption is lower at times when 
leisure is high, consumption will also be lower. Conversely, if 0 < 1, then Ucl > 011 • 
Most empirical estimates SUggt;::'l that 0 > 1. Ghez and Becker (1975) report 
a value of ~ = 0.83 (0 = 1.20). Auerbach and Kotlikoff (1987) report values of ~ 
between 0.3 and 1.5 (0 between 0.8 and 3.33), but select a value of 0.8 (0 = 1.25) 
as their base value in simulations. Attanasio and Weber (1995) report an estimate 
of 0 = 2.2, while Barsky et al. (1997) estimate that most people have a value of 
o greater than 2, and many have a value greater than 4. Altig et al. (2001) select a 
parameter value for ~ of 0.8 (0 = 1.25) for their simulations, while Diamond and 
Zodrow (2007, 2008) use a value of 0.6 (0 = 1.67) in their benchmark simulation. 
French's (2005) estimates imply an intratemporal elasticity of substitution between 
0.18 and 0.45 (0 between 2.2 and 5.6), and Ziliak and Kniesner (2005) report values 
11 Authors such as Hurd and Rohwedder (2003), Low (2005), and Laitner and Silvennan (2005) 
refer to consumption and leisure being Frisch substitutes if () > 1. They refer to Frisch complements 












ranging from 0.09 to 0.23 (0 between 4.34 and 11.11). We thus proceed with our 
model, concentrating on the case where 0 > 1. 
For a given retirement date, and hence a given value of It in every period, our 
maximization problem at time t is given by: 
Now, maximization gives rise to the same first order condition as in the sepa-
rable case-
From 1.26, we have 
(1-1))(1-8) 
1 (It+l) 1)(1 8) 1 
Ct = (f3R) 1)(1-8)-1. T . Ct+1 (1.29) 
which for t < tret - 1 , and t ~ tret ::::} 
(1.30) 
and between tret - 1 and tret 
1 (1-1))(1-8) 
Ctret-l = (f3R) 1)(1 8) 1 • (I) 1)(1-8)-1 . Ct
ret (1.31) 
Thus, even if f3R was equal to unity, for 0 > 1, consumption before retirement 
is greater than consumption after retirement. This indeed affirms authors such as 
French (2005) and Hurd and Rohwedder (2005) who have indicated that the observed 












Proposition 1.3 In the case where preferences are non-separable in consump-
tion and leisure, at any point in time, t 
RT - t 
Ct = . Wt (1.32) 
T-t [ i (1-'1)(1-8)] L RT-t-j. (J3R)-'1(1 8) 1 • (~) '1(1 8) 1 
j~ ~ 
Wi(i:::~T~:::1 ~;;~:~(:.::~;;)out of total wealth equal to: 
j=O t+3 
Proof See Appendix to chapter I .• 
Observation 1.2: We see that the mpc in the non-separable case is a function of 
the retirement date. 
Observation 1.3: For e > 1, the marginal propensity to consume out of total 
wealth is higher when the agent is working, than when the agent is retired. 
Proof See Appendix to Chapter I. • 
Observation 1.4: An agent working in time period t will experience a higher 
marginal propensity to consume out of total wealth in the non-separable case 
where e > 1, than he would in the separable case. 
Proof This should be obvious simply by comparing the mpc in the separable and 












Observation 1.5: An agent who is working in time period t, whose marginal util-
ity of consumption is negatively related to leisure, and who anticipates a postpone-
ment in his retirement date, will experience a decrease in the marginal propensity 
to consume out of total wealth at time t. 
Proof See appendix to chapter 1 .• 
Now, taking the natural log of expression 1.32 we have 
In Ct = In 
R T - t 
+lnwt (1.33) 





-. ) ~ln T-t i (1 1)(1 8) 
~ln Ct 
I: [RT-t- j '(!3R) - 1)(1 8) 1.( -.!L) 1){1 8) 1 ] 





Since (T_' [ _ R~-' ,.-,)(>-') l) is a function of the retire-
I: RT-t-j . (!3R) 1)(1 8) 1.( A) 1){1 8) 1 
j=O t+J 
ment date (see Observation 1.5), we have Proposition 1.4. 
Proposition 1.4 
we have 














where the first term is positive, and the second term is negative. That is, when 
preferences are non-separable in consumption and leisure, the relative change in 
consumption for a unit change in the retirement date is equal to the relative change 
in total wealth, plus the relative change in the marginal propensity to consume, 
for this unit change in the anticipated retirement date. 
Thus, when preferences are non -separable in consumption and leisure, the 
effect of later retirement dates on consumption is twofold. The positive effect on 
consumption caused by an increase in total wealth, is dampened by a second negative 
effect on consumption caused by a decrease in the path of future leisure, and hence 
the marginal propensity to consume out of total wealth. Thus, the relative increase in 
consumption is smaller than in the separable case. 
Corollary 1.1 The effect of later retirement dates on consumption approaches 
the separable case as () ---? 1, or as I ---? 1. This is since the magnitude of the second 
effect diminishes under such conditions. 
Proof See appendix to chapter I .• 
Corollary 1.2 The effect of later retirement dates on consumption deviates to a 
larger extent from the separable case as I gets larger. This is since the magnitude of 












The proof of this corollary is very simple and simply results from the fact that 
Ifl.!:;-I is larger if I is larger. Note that for this effect to dominate the wealth effect, 
would require an unrealistically high value of1, and it is thus unreasonable to expect 
that an increase in the retirement date would ever lead to a decrease in consumption. 
1.4 Effect on Saving Behavior 
Saving at any point in time, t, is given by: 
St = Yt - Ct (1.36) 
Taking the natural log on both sides 
In St = In(Yt - Ct) (1.37) 
and using the law for the log of a summation/subtraction, 
(1.38) 
Now, as the change in tret gets very small, 
(1.39) 
While it is clear that saving decreases in response to an increase in the antic-
ipated retirement date, we are interested in how the magnitude of this effect differs 
12 Note that this expression is the derivative of the expression In y + In( 1 - e(ln c-In y») with respect 
to tret (Iny is independent of tret ). ~~n 8, approximates this expession as Atret gets very small and 













between the separable and non-separable cases. We know that ~~:~t is smaller in 
the non-separable case than it is in the separable case (from Proposition 1.4). We 
also know that in Ct is larger in the non-separable case than it is in the separable case 
(see Observation 1.4), so that (l-eOn!t InYt»)' e(1nct-lnYt) is larger in the non-separable 
case than it is in the separable case. Which effect is dominant? It is easy to show that 
the relative increase in (l_e(ln!t-InYt») . e(lnct-lnYt) from the separable to non-separable 
case, is greater than the relative decrease in ~~~e~t from the separable to non-separable 
cases. Thus ~Itnst is greater in absolute value in the non-separable case than in the 
u. ret 
separable case. 
Proposition 1.5 The relative decrease in savings of an agent at time t, in 
response to a later anticipated retirement date, is greater in magnitude in the non-
separable case, where the cross-derivative of the utility function is negative, than in 
the separable case. 
Corollary 1.3 The effect of later retirement dates on saving approaches the 
separable case as () - 1, or as I-I. 
Corollary 1.4 The effect of later retirement dates on saving deviates to a larger 













In this section we define parameters for the models described above in order to quan-
titatively simulate the effect of later anticipated retirement dates on consumption and 









Table 1.2: Parameters 
Note that for the sake of simplicity we abstract from the interest rate and rate of 
time preference and set p = r = 0 =?- f3 = R = 1. We also normalize income, with 
I = 1000 and i = 600, so that the pension income replacement rate is 0.6. Figures 
1.1 and 1.2 show the relative changes in consumption and saving in both the separable 
and non-separable cases for varying values of (). It is evident that the relative increase 
in consumption is smaller in the non-separable case than in the separable case. It is 
also clear that the relative decrease in saving is greater in the non-separable case than 
in the separable case. In both the case of consumption and saving, the effect in the 












Figure 1. [; Relative Change in COll~umption : Change in Retirement Age from 65 to 
67 





Figure 1.2: Relative Change in Saving; Change in Retirement Age from 65 to 67 
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A postponement in the date of retirement will result in younger individuals consum-
ing more and saving less prior to the initial anticipated retirement date. Further, the 
relative increase in consumption is smaller, and relative decrease in saving larger in 
the case where preferences are non-separable in consumption and leisure-and the 
marginal utility of consumption is negatively related to leisure, than in the case where 
preferences are separable. 
In light of this theoretical outcome, the upward trend in retirement dates that 
the US economy (and other OECD countries) has experienced since the mid 90's, 
and that is expected to persist for some time into the future, is likely to have had, 
and continue to have an adverse effect on the saving behavior of the young. More 
so, in light of evidence supporting the view that the marginal utility of consumption 
is negatively related to leisure, this adverse effect is worse than would be the case 
if utility is seen as a function of consumption only, or if utility were separable in 
consumption and leisure. Policies in OECD countries promoting later retirement 
ages are for good reason. The burden on the social security system of the baby 
boomers entering retirement, as well as increasing life expectancy, are amongst the 
most important of these. Cognizance, however, needs to be taken of the unintended 
adverse effect on saving behavior. 
In concluding this chapter we need to take note of the following caveat. It is 












tirement date, we are analyzing the direct effect on consumption/saving behavior of 
a change in the retirement date. In reality, it is likely that some of the factors in-
fluencing later retirement dates are endogenous to the consumption/saving decision, 
and that there are multiple effects at play. We do not, in this paper, attempt to ana-
lyze the general equilibrium relationship between retirement dates and savings in the 
economy. The point of this paper is merely to analyze one effect- the direct effect 
of later retirement dates on pre-retirement saving behavior - under varying prefer-
ence structures. While this effect is one of many at play in the complex relationship 
between retirement dates and savings behavior, it is none the less very relevant to the 
overall dynamics. 
1.A Appendix to Chapter 1 
Proof of Proposition 1.1. 
We use recursive methods, as illustrated by Stockey et al. (1989). 
From condition 1.9, we know that all worth should be exhausted by the end of 
time T. Thus 
CT= WT (1.40) 













where mT is the marginal propensity to consume out of total worth in period 
T, with mT = 1. 
Now, by equation 1.17 we have Cr-l = C8R)-~Cr, and by equation 1.7 
1 
(fJR)e . CT-l = (WT-l - Cr-l) . R (1.42) 
"r-l = ((f3R)~ + R) . Wr-l 
I.e. 
and by continuing recursively, we have in general 




mT-k = k . (1.44) 
~(fJR)~Rk-j 
j=O 











Proof of Proposition 1.3 
Again we have 
CT= WT 
which now implies by 1.7 and 1.29 
_ 1 IT-l '1(1 9) 1 
[ 
(1-'1)(1-9) 1 
CT-l· (f3R) '1(1-9)-1 ( z:;-) = (WT-l - CT-l) . R 
and 
and in general 
CT-k = . 
j l (1-1))(1-9) ] 

















Proof of Observation 1.3: 
Suppose the agent is retired in period t + j for some j =/=: o. 
Th It _ { 1 ift ~ t ret (agent is retired in t) 
en lHi - t < 1 ift < t ret (agent still working in t) 
Now for 0 > 1, 
.6.mpc 




Thus, if the agent is retired in period t, the mpc will be smaller than if the agent 
is working in period t. 
as 
Proof of Observation 1.5: 




Now, for 0> 1, 
(1-1)(1-8) ] 
1 • (t) 1)( 1 8) 1 • 
1 ift+j < tret (agent still working in t + j) 























The mpc then becomes independent of (ltl:i) '1(1 8) 1 ,and hence the retirement 
date. Therefore, the effect of a change in the retirement date on consumption tends 
to the separable case, i.e., 
















Retirement Date Effects on Pre-Retirement 
Wealth Accumulation: An Empirical Study 
2.1 Introduction 
The responsiveness of saving decisions to agents' expectations regarding the length 
of their work lives is important from a policy perspective. Whether, or not, individu-
als take cognizance of their expected retirement date in saving decisions, has implica-
tions for how recent and expected future trends towards later retirement in the United 
States will affect the savings rate in the economy. Do individuals take account of nec-
essary parameters, such as retirement date expectations, when making consumption-
saving decisions? The now common notion of the retirement-consumption puzzle, 
where consumption levels are shown to drop at retirement, might indicate not. The 
retirement-consumption puzzle is indicative of saving shortfalls at retirement, and 
seriously threatens the life- cycle hypothesis, in which rational, risk averse agents 
maximize lifetime utility by smoothing the marginal utility of consumption across 
different time periods. Various explanations have been offered in order to explain 
the retirement-consumption puzzle. For example, Banks et al. (1998) show how the 












individuals to retire earlier than expected. Haider and Stephens (2007) confirm the 
importance of such unanticipated shocks in the timing of retirement, but maintain 
that not all of the drop in consumption at retirement can be attributed to such shocks. 
Bernheim et al. (2001) suggest that prior to retirement individuals incorrectly per-
ceive themselves to have enough retirement resources. When they reach retirement 
they may realize this is not the case, and are forced to reduce their consumption. 
French (2005) and Laitner and Silverman (2005) show that a drop in consumption at 
retirement is consistent with the life-cycle hypothesis when preferences are seen to 
be non-separable in consumption and leisure. In such a case, smoothing the marginal 
utility of consumption over time does not necessarily imply the smoothing of con-
sumption over time, and the drop in consumption at retirement may thus be planned. 13 
Alternatively, the fact may remain that individuals are myopic in that they don't plan 
properly in order to ensure that consumption does not drop at retirement. They may 
simply not be taking into account the relevant life-cycle parameters, such as the ex-
pected timing of retirement, when making saving decisions. 
In this chapter we look directly at individuals' intentions ex ante to retirement 
by investigating whether agents' decisions to accumulate wealth are responsive to 
their subjective expectations regarding their retirement date. In conducting our analy-
sis, we use data from seven waves of the Health and Retirement study, a nationally 
13 Other explanations have been offered by various authors. For example, Hurd and Rohwedder 
(2003) suggest that after retirement individuals substitute home production for bought goods, so that 
a drop in consumption expenditure does not necessarily imply a drop in consumption. Laibson (1998) 













representative study of the elderly population in the United States, and look at the ef-
fect ofthe subjective probability of working full time after age 62 (p62) on wealth ac-
cumulation. Further, we analyze whether this effect differs amongst married women, 
single women, married men and single men, and whether the effect varies with pen-
sion status. 
Central to our analysis is the issue of endogeneity between retirement deci-
sions and wealth. The problem in such models arises due to two main issues. In 
cross-sectional analysis it is not possible to control for unobserved heterogeneity 
such as tastes, which might effect both the timing of retirement and wealth accumu-
lation. The second issue is the direct endogeneity between retirement date expec-
tations/decisions and wealth. While expectations regarding the timing of retirement 
are likely to have a direct effect on wealth accumulation prior to retirement, pre re-
tirement wealth is also likely to have an effect on retirement decisions. We attempt 
to correct for these problems as follows. In using panel data we are able to conduct 
Fixed Effects regression analysis, which allows us to control for unobserved hetero-
geneity across individuals that might affect both wealth accumulation and retirement 
date decisions. We further attempt to correct for the direct endogeneity problem (be-
tween wealth and retirement expectations) by using Instrumental Variables estima-
tion. We thus conduct an Instrumental Variables Fixed Effects Regression to analyze 
the effect of exogenous variation in p62 on wealth accumulation. We use respon-












is currently working in, as an instrument for the probability of working full time after 
age 62. 
The instrumental variable approach has the added advantage of dealing with 
measurement error and focal point responses (answers centred around 0,50 or 100) 
that tend to plague subjective probability responses. A lot of the literature interprets 
focal point answers as an indication of the agent being uncertain as to the proba-
bility of the event, which in tum leads to him reporting biased estimates (cf., e.g., 
Lillard and Willis, 2001; Hill et at., 2004; Hurd et at., 2005). To the extent that these 
probabilities still reflect an individual's perception of the probability, they reflect ex-
actly what we want them to in our analysis, and there is no problem. As discussed 
by Smith et at. (2001) and Khawaja et at. (2006), these focal point answers con-
tain a lot of information regarding an agent's belief, in that a SUbjective probability 
of working full time after age 62 of one indicates a very high belief of the proba-
bility of the event occurring, while a subjective probability of zero indicates a very 
low belief of the probability of the event occurring, even to the extent that these es-
timates are biased. However, Basset and Lumsdaine (2001), say focal point answers 
and general inconsistencies in the answering of probabilistic questions are indicative 
of low cognition and inadequate understanding of the nature of probabilities. From 
this point of view, responses can be regarded as implausible estimates of the relevant 
subjective probability. To the extent that focal point answers and general inconsis-












implausible estimates of the individual's subjective probability, the problem needs to 
be corrected. Since ignoring observations with these focal point answers is implau-
sible, firstly due to the large number of observations reflecting these responses, and 
secondly due to the possible (and in my view, likely) information content displayed 
in them, instrumenting for these probabilities with other non-probabilistic variables 
mitigates any possible problem 14 • 
Similar to our approach is Bloom et al. (2007), who use the health and retire-
ment study (HRS) to look at the effect of subjective survival probabilities on wealth 
accumulation decisions in the United States. Bloom et al find that an increase in 
the subjective probability of living to age 75 increases household wealth amongst 
couples only. They do not, however, control for retirement date expectations in the 
wealth regressions. Whether individuals respond to variation in sUbjective retirement 
expectations in a similar fashion as they do to variation in subjective survival expec-
tations, is a matter to be determined empirically. To date, there are no studies that 
include subjective retirement probabilities in wealth regressions. 
The remainder of this chapter proceeds as follows. In section 2.2 we discuss 
our data and methodology, also looking at various descriptive statistics. In section 
2.3 we discuss our regression results. We end with a discussion and conclusion in 
section 2.4. 













2.2 Data and Methodology 
We draw on data using seven waves (1992- 2004) ofthe Health and Retirement study 
(HRS). Conducted by the Institute for Social Research (lSR) at the University of 
Michigan, the HRS is a nationally representative survey of the elderly population in 
the United states. The initial survey was conducted in 1992 and the sample consisted 
of individuals born between 1931-1941 (aged 51-61 in 1992), and their spouses of 
any age. This initial wave consisted of 12652 individuals. These respondents were 
reinterviewed in 1994 and 1996. In 1993, another survey (Assets and Health Dy-
namics amongst the Oldest-old, AHEAD) interviewed respondents born in or before 
1923. They were reinterviewed in 1995. In 1998, the two cohorts were merged 
into a single sample, and another cohort of respondents born between 1924 and 1930 
was added to this sample. The sample was again representative of American indi-
viduals aged 51 and above. The 1998 sample was reinterviewed in 2000 and 2002, 
and in 2004 a new cohort (1948-53) was added. The HRS includes extensive data on 
wealth, retirement and subjective expectations, making it ideally suited for the pur-
pose of our study. We look at married households, single male households and single 
female households separately, since we feel that the behavioral foundations govern-
ing wealth accumulation, and in particular in response to retirement expectations, 
will differ across these groups of individuals. 
The dependent variable used in this analysis is net household wealth (WEALTH). 












cial security and work sponsored pension wealth. In particular, it is calculated as the 
sum of: Net value of primary residence; net value of vehicles; net value of businesses; 
net value of IRA, Keogh accounts; net value of stocks, mutual funds and investment 
trusts; value of checking, savings and money market accounts; value of CD, govern-
ment saving bonds, and T-bills; net value of bonds and bond funds; net value of all 
other savings; less all other debt. 
The problem when dealing with wealth as a variable is both one of scale, where 
very large absolute values dominate a regression, and one of very skewed distribu-
tion. For both reasons, a log transformation would be desirable. The difficulty with a 
direct log transformation, is that the wealth variable takes on both zero and negative 
values, for which the log transformation is not defined. Authors have dealt with the 
issue of non positive wealth values in various ways. Some authors have taken a log 
transformation, dropping households with non-positive wealth values (cf., e.g., Dia-
mond and Hausman, 1984; Kings and Dicks-Mireaux, 1982). However, restricting a 
sample in this sense can create a significant selection problem. Other authors have 
replaced the non-positive values with a small positive number before applying the 
log transformation (cf., e.g., Engen and Gale, 2000, Carol and Samwick, 1997, 1998; 
Lundberg and Ward-Batts, 2000). The problem with this method is that it does not 
account for variation between observations with different negative values, and be-
tween negative values and zero values. An alternative approach is to use the Inverse 












and first applied to wealth equations by Burbridge et ai. (1988), has subsequently 
been used in wealth regressions by numerous authors (cf., Carroll et aI., 2003; Cobb-
Clark and Hildebrand, 2003; Kapteyn and Panis, 2003; Wenzl ow et aI., 2004; Pence, 
2006). The Inverse Hyperbolic Sine function is given by 
h(x) = log(Jx2 + 1 + x) (2.1) 
and takes care of non-positive values of x 15. We apply this transformation to the 
wealth variable in our regression analysis. 
The explanatory variable of interest is the probability of working full time after 
age 62 (p62). The question asked in the HRS is "Thinking about work generally and 
not just your present job, what do you think are the chances that you will be work-
ing full- time after you reach age 62?" The question is asked only to individuals who 
are working for pay at the time of the interview. We therefore think of the answer as 
a conditional probability- the probability of working full time after reaching age 62, 
given working at age x < 62. The variable is calibrated on a scale of 0-100. Since 
p62 is an individual variable, and WEALTH is a household variable, it is necessarily 
to control for spouse characteristics in the regressions when we have married indi-
viduals. Figure 2.1 shows the distribution ofp62 for all individuals. We have a clear 
case of focal point answers, with probabilities centering around 0, 50 and 100. We 
also show, in figure 2.2, how the p62 variable tends to follow a random walk over 
time. 
15 Some studies insert a dampening factor, B, such thatthe function is given by g(x, B) = log( VBx2 + 1 + 












We include control variables in the regressions which may be correlated with 
both WEALTH and p62 .We include the hourly wage rate (WGHR), and the number 
of hours worked per week (HOURS), to control for current labor/self-employment 
income. The hourly wage rate is an effective hourly wage rate in that it takes into 
account labor earnings, whether as a result of a set salary, or, whether derived from 
profit sharing. We control for various other sources of income (OTHERINC) which 
includes lump sum payments from insurance, pension or inheritance, plus alimony 
and any other source of income, excluding labor/self employed income, capital in-
come, and any pension or social security income. We include three pension dummy 
variables: PENSION<=62 is a dummy variable taking on the value 1 ifan individual 
has a work sponsored pension and is eligible for full benefits at age 62 or younger 
(This is our base category). PENSION>62 is a dummy variable taking on the value 
1 if the individual has a work sponsored pension and is eligible for full benefits after 
age 62. NOPENSION is a dummy variable taking on the value 1 if the individual does 
not have a work sponsored pension. If the individual's planning horizon is longer 
than 10 years, the variable (FINPLAN) takes on the value 1. This variable is a proxy 
for the effective time rate of preference. (HEALTH) is the individuals self reported 
health which takes on the value 1 if the individual reports hislher health to be fair or 
poor, and takes on the value zero if health is reported to be excellent, very good or 
good. (HCOV) takes on a value of 1 if the individual does not have employer spon-












for by looking at the respondent's self reported probability of living till age 75 (p75), 
while the respondent's self reported probability of leaving a large bequest (>=$100 
000) is given by (PBEQUEST). Both mortality expectations and bequest intentions are 
likely to be correlated with saving decisions and retirement expectations. Other vari-
ables controlled for are: age of individual (AGE); marital status for single individuals, 
i.e., whether (DIVORCED) or (WIDOWED), with the base category being people who 
have never been married; and number of children in the household (HCHILD). Con-
trolling for marital history and number of children is important in controlling for the 
structure of the single household. A divorced single would behave very differently 
from a single person who has never been married, or is widowed. In the case of non 
fixed effects regressions we control for (RACE) and (EDUCD). RACE takes on a value 
of 1 if the individual is white and zero otherwise. EDUCD takes on the value 1 if the 
individual has a college education and zero otherwise. Time dummies are included 
in all regressions. 
As an instrument for p62, we use the individual's response to a question asking 
what the usual retirement age is for people in their kind of job. USUALD is a dummy 
variable taking on a value 1 if the age given is 62 or younger. We transform the 
variable into a dummy variable in this fashion, since what is likely to matter for the 
probability of working past age 62, is whether the usual retirement age is past age 
62. The first stage regressions in Tables 2.14 and 2.15 confirm the appropriateness of 












We provide a brief intuitive argument for the validity of the instrument. It might 
be argued that there are certain job characteristics such as pension and health cover-
age characteristics that might effect both the usual age of retirement on the job and 
individual saving behavior. Hurd and Mcgarry (1993a, 1993b) show that the pen-
sion characteristic that most determines the age of retirement, is the age at which an 
individual can start receiving full benefits (usually referred to as the normal retire-
ment age of the pension). Since we have controlled for this pension characteristic 
in the regression, variation in the usual retirement age should not reflect variation in 
the normal retirement age of the pension. Hurd and Mcgarry (1993a) also show that 
whether or not retirees are covered by employee health insurance also influences the 
probability of working past age 62. This is since individuals only become eligible 
for medicare at age 65. Since we have controlled for this in the regression, varia-
tion in the usual retirement age does not reflect variation in health care of retirees of 
the firm. The effective hourly wage controls for earning characteristics of the job that 
might simultaneously effect the individual's saving behavior and the usual retirement 
age on the job. It is thus likely, that any variation in the usual retirement age on the 
job, is a reflection of job characteristics such as physical and mental demands, stress 
levels, and convention in decision making- characteristics that are all likely to be 












In the context of married couples we control for the characteristics of both 
spouses. All variables referring to the husband will be prefixed with an H, and those 
referring to the wife prefixed with a W. 
In Tables 2.1 to 2.5, we present various summary/descriptive statistics concern-
ing the WEALTH and p62 variables. In Table 2.6 we present some summary statistics 
on the instrument. Table 2.1 illustrates the fact that on average married households 
have the most wealth, followed by single men. Single women have the least wealth. 
This makes sense in that allot of married households have two potential earners. It 
could also be the case that even if the wife does not earn an income, married men may 
tend to accumulate more wealth since they feel a greater sense of responsibility than 
single men. In terms of single men and women, men tend to be better educated, have 
higher earning jobs and uninterrupted careers, allowing them to accumulate more 
wealth than women. It is also true that if a single woman has children, to the ex-
tent that the father does not take enough responsibility for the financial well- being of 
the children, this becomes the mother's primary responsibility, thereby draining her 
resources. Table 2.2 illustrates that married women have a substantially lower prob-
ability of working full time past age 62 than any other group. Table 2.3 shows the 
percentage of individuals in each group having wealth less than, equal to, and greater 
than zero. Probably for the same reasons as mentioned above, single women have the 
least amount of positive wealth, followed by single men, and then by married cou-












wealth levels, for p62 greater than, and smaller than its median. With the exception 
of single men, higher probabilities of working full time after age 62 are associated 
with lower wealth levels. Of course the question to be answered is which way the di-
rection of association runs. Table 2.5 shows how the mean of p62 changes with age, 
and pension characteristics. We see that for all groups, the sUbjective probability of 
working after age 62 increases as the individual approaches age 62. We notice too, 
that the average probability of working full time past age 62 is lower for individuals 
who can receive full pension benefits at 62 or younger, relative to individuals who 
can receive full pension benefits only after age 62, or individuals who have no pen-
sion at all. Table 2.6 shows the distribution of the usual retirement age on the job. 
We note that only about 20% of people perceive the usual retirement age as being 62 
or below. 
As indicated in the introduction, we conduct a Fixed Effects regression to con-
trol for unobserved heterogeneity that may affect both the expected retirement dates 
and wealth levels. We further attempt to correct for the direct endogeneity prob-
lem (between wealth and retirement expectations) by using Instrumental Variables 
estimation. We thus conduct an Instrumental Variables Fixed Effects regression to 












2.3 Regression Results 
For wealth values not too close to zero, the inverse hyperbolic sine function (lHS), 
h( ) { 
log(2wEALTH) for WEALTH>O 
WEALTH ~ 
-log(2wEALTH) for WEALTH<O 
(2.2) 
The IHS is anti-symmetric so that 
h(WEALTH) = -h( -WEALTH) (2.3) 
Thus, interpreting the regression coefficients of the IHS regression, is essentially the 
same as interpreting a regression with the dependent variable logged in the usual 
manner. Multiplying the coefficient by 100, simply shows a percentage change in 
wealth for a one unit change in any of the explanatory variables, x. 
For all groups, we report the results of the OLS, Fixed Effects and IV Fixed 
Effects regressions. First stage regressions for IV Fixed Effects are given in the ap-
pendix as tables 2.14 and 2.15. Table 2.7 reports the regression results for single 
females, Table 2.8 for single males, and Tables 2.9 and 2.10 for married couples. The 
reported hausman statistics for the IV regressions indicate that the IV fixed effects re-
gression is most appropriate in all cases, and the significance ofthe USUALD variable 
in the first stage regressions indicates that it is certainly legitimate. 
When looking at the point estimates of the IV Fixed Effects regressions, we no-
tice that single individuals tend to behave differently from married individuals with 
regards to how they respond to an increase in the subjective probability of working 












large negative causal effect running from p62 to WEALTH. In particular, for single 
women, the estimate implies that a 10 percentage point increase in the subjective 
probability of working past age 62, results in a 28% decrease in wealthl6 , while for 
single men, the same increase in this probability results in a 25% decrease in wealth. 
However, while these point estimates are very similar, the estimate for single women 
is significant at the 10% level, while that for single men is not. There is thus a large 
amount of variability around the point estimate for single men. While this probably 
has something to do with the fact that in the case of single men, the variable usu-
ALD is a weak instrument for p62 ( F-stat -t-stat squared- on USUALD in first stage 
regression is less than ten), we still are inclined to have less confidence in this esti-
mate than in that for single women. The fact, however, remains that the difference 
in the magnitude of the effect between single individuals and married individuals is 
stark, and suggests that single individuals on a whole behave very differently from 
married individuals in this respect. The point estimates for married individuals sug-
gests that a ten percentage point increase in the husband's subjective probability of 
working past age 62, decreases household wealth by only 4%, while a ten percentage 
point increase in the wife's subjective probability of working past age 62 increases 
household wealth by 1 %. Neither estimate is significantly different from zero. 
16 Or, equivalently, a one percentage point increase in the subjective probability of working past 
age 62 results in a 2.8% decrease in household wealth. We interpret our estmates in terms of a 10 
percentage point increase in p62, since it more plausible to expect a change in this variable of the 












How can we explain the fact that married individuals seem less likely to take 
cognizance of their retirement date expectations when making saving decisions? It 
is important to note that the sample of married couples we have in our regression 
are those where both partners are currently working (This is because they will only 
enter the regression sample if neither the value for HP62 or wp62 is missing. This 
will only occur if they are both working). Thus, a change in one partner's probabil-
ity of working past age 62, keeping the other's constant might not translate into a 
significant enough change in future household income to induce changes in house-
hold saving. Further, it is probable that one partner's unchanged p62 will allow a 
certain threshold of consumption to be maintained, even if the other partner retires 
earlier. Thus, smoothing consumption completely may not be as important as simply 
maintaining consumption above a certain minimum threshold. We attempt to verify 
this hypothesis in two different ways. First, we add an interaction term of HP62 with 
wp62. The instrument for this interaction term is simply the interaction ofHUSUALD 
with WUSUALD. This interaction term will show the effect of variation at the same 
time in both partners' p62. As a second check, we take a sample of married men 
whose wives are not currently working, and check whether they are more inclined to 
take cognizance of HP62 in saving decisions. We do the same for a sample of mar-
ried women whose husbands are not currently working. The results are presented in 
Table 2.11. Looking at the point estimates, the interaction term presents an effect al-












point increase in both the husband and wive's probabilities of working past age 62, 
results in 29% less household wealth, than if just one spouse's probability increased 
by the same amount (in which instance there was a negligible effect). Looking at the 
case where the husband is the sole earner, we see a massive effect. A ten percentage 
point increase in the husbands probability of working past age 62, results in a 70% 
decrease in household wealth. Again, however, we need to take cognizance of the 
large standard errors around these point estimates, probably due to the relative weak-
ness of the instrument for married individuals. While there probably is a large effect 
for married men who are sole earners, 70% is most likely an overestimate. 
In the case of the wife being the sole earner, the magnitude of the effect is very 
small, i.e., an increase in such a woman's probability of working past age 62 does not 
have much of an effect on household wealth. This sample of women (whose husbands 
are most likely unable to work), are probably less able to save for retirement, due to 
more pressing and immediate responsibilities. 
We have thus far established that married couples where both partners are 
working, are the least likely to alter their savings behavior in response to a change 
in the probability of working full time after age 62 of just one partner. Apart from 
sole earning married women, all other individuals seem to take cognizance of this 
probability in wealth accumulation decisions. Further, due to the small standard er-
rors around the point estimate for single women, we are most confident in this effect 












of how responsive household wealth is to changes in the household probability of 
working past age 62. While (with the exception of sole earning married women) a 
10 percentage point increase in the household probability of working past age 62 re-
sults in a decrease in household wealth of 25% or more, the same percentage point 
change for just one member of a two person working household results in a change 
in wealth of far less than 10%. It thus seems that it is not so much complete con-
sumption smoothing that is important, as it is to maintain a certain minimum level of 
consumption, when this can be achieved by the spouse who anticipates no change in 
hislher retirement date. 
It is interesting to note that in all instances (for single women, single men, 
married men) the age at which one is eligible for full pension benefits is not sig-
nificant in the wealth equation, but is significant in determining p62 (see first-stage 
regressions in appendix). Thus, whether individuals have a pension, and the age of 
pension eligibility, affects their retirement expectations, rather than their saving deci-
sions. However, if retirement expectations change for reasons other than a change in 
pension status, pension status might affect the manner in which individuals' savings 
behavior reacts to such a change in retirement expectations. Thus, as a last mea-
sure, we analyze whether pension characteristics, and in particular, the earliest age 
at which one is eligible to receive full benefits, is significant in determining whether 
individuals take cognizance of retirement date expectations in wealth accumulation 












if retiring early imposes a significant wealth or liquidity effect. An individual who 
expects to retire at or before age 62 and is eligible for full pension benefits at or be-
fore age 62, is in a far better position than someone who expects to retire at or before 
age 62, but is only eligible for full pension benefits after age 62, or does not have a 
pension at all. We thus run separate IV Fixed Effects regressions for the sample of in-
dividuals with NOPENSION=1 or PENSION>62 =1 (no pension, or eligibility for full 
pension benefits after age 62), and for those with PENSION<=62=1 (pension with 
eligibility for full benefits at age 62 or earlier). 
Tables 2.12 and 2.13 show the coefficient on p62 by pension characteristics. 
Married individuals here are those from the original sample of a two person working 
household. We notice that on a whole (with the exception of single men), the negative 
causal relationship running from p62 to wealth is far more predominant if individuals 
have no pension, or are only eligible for full benefits after age 62. 
2.4 Conclusion 
This chapter investigates the impact of subjective expectations regarding the timing 
of retirement on pre-retirement wealth accumulation. More specifically, we analyze 
the effect of the agent's subjective belief that he will work full time after age 62 
(p62) on his current level of wealth. We use Instrumental Variables Fixed Effects 
regression to correct for any endogeneity between p62 and wealth. The individual's 












On a whole, the point estimates suggest that the responsiveness of individuals' 
saving behavior to retirement dates expectations is large. A ten percentage point 
increase in the probability of working past age 62 results in a decrease in household 
wealth well in excess of 20% for most demographic groups. There are two notable 
exceptions. One is married women who are the sole earners. The other is when 
there is a change in the probability of working past age 62 for just one member of a 
two person (married) working household. While a simultaneous ten percentage point 
increase in this probability for both partners results in a 29% decrease in household 
wealth, the same percentage point increase in this probability for just one partner 
has a negligible effect on household wealth. It is, thus, probable that the household 
is happy to rely on one partner's unchanged p62 to maintain a certain consumption 
threshold, in the event that the other partner retires earlier. It thus seems that it is 
not so much complete consumption smoothing that is important, as it is to maintain 
a certain minimum level of consumption. 
We note that the responsiveness of saving decisions to retirement date expec-
tations is generally more predominant, the more a change in retirement expectations 
imposes a wealth or liquidity effect, as measured by pension status. In particular, the 
negative causal relationship running from p62 to wealth is far more predominant if 












It is important to take cognizance of the fact that except for the case of single 
women, in which case the instrument is strong, the standard errors around the other 
point estimates are large. We are thus most confident in our results for single women. 
In that --on a whole- the point estimates suggest that individuals do seem to 
take cognizance of retirement date expectations in decisions to accumulate wealth, 
the retirement-consumption- puzzle is not due to complete myopic behavior. We 
have however shown that -in certain instances- it is likely that complete consump-
tion smoothing is not as important as maintaining a certain minimum threshold level 
of consumption, in which instance consumption would drop to a degree at retire-
ment. Either way, from a policy perspective, to the extent that individuals do-- in the 
large- alter their saving behavior in response to changes in the expected timing of 
retirement, changing trends in retirement dates is likely to have an effect on savings 
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Table 2.1: Summary Statistics for Wealth 
p62 
Single Women Single Men Married Men Married Women 
mean 53.2 52.7 52.8 40 
median 50 50 50 41.5 
standard deviation 39.4 39.6 39.3 37.9 
no of observations 6342 2921 12843 14953 
Table 2.2: Summary Statistics for p62 
Single Women Single Men Married Households 
% with WEALTH <0 
% with WEALTH=O 










Table 2.3: Distribution of Wealth 
mean WEALTH median WEALTH 
Single Women 
p62>50 128743 51500 
p62<50 144765 55300 
Single Men 
p62> 50 313 156 65250 
p62< 50 186768 65100 
Married Couples 
HP62>50 300500 115800 
HP62< 50 342300 168000 
wp62 >40 305740 136000 
wp62<40 349555 175000 













AGE mean p62 pension status meanp62 
Single Women Single Women 
AGE <56 50.1 PENSION<=62=1 39.8 
AGE>= 56 55.7 PENSION>62=1 OR NOPENSION=1 54.2 
Single Men Single Men 
AGE<56 51.4 PENSION <=62= 1 37.5 
AGE >=56 53.9 PENSION>62=1 OR NOPENSION=1 54.1 
Married Men Married Men 
HAGE <56 50.84 HPENSION <=62= 1 35.8 
HAGE>=56 54.2 HPENSION>62=1 OR HNOPENSION=1 54.8 
Married Women Married Women 
WAGE <56 30 WPENSION <=62= 1 31.0 
WAGE>=56 50 WPENSION>62=1 OR WNOPENSION=1 42.3 
Table 2.5: Mean p62 by Age and Pension Status 
Single Women Single Men Married Women Married Men 
% with USUAL <=62 18 19 22.4 22 
% with USUAL >62 25.1 27.6 24.2 30.86 
% with no usual or otherwise 56.9 53.4 53.4 47.1 
no observations 9094 4378 18199 20872 















































CONS 5.301 *** 
(6.37) 





































































hausman stat for IV regression 46.50** 
Notes: Time/ wave dummies are included in all regressions .. 
* denotes significance at the 10% level; * * at the 5% level, and * * * at the 1 % level. 
Figures in parentheses are t values. 













OLS FIXED EFFECTS IV FIXED EFFECTS 
IHS(WEALTH) IHS(WEALTH) IHS(WEALTH) 
p62 - 0.001 0.004 -0.025 
(-0.15) (1.27) (-0.67) 
WGHR 0.005*** 0.001 0.001 
(3.45) (0.30) (0.30) 
LNOTHERINC 0.053** 0.040 0.023 
(2.31) (1.49) (0.83) 
PENSION>62 0.028 -0.369 -0.110 
(0.09) ( -1.03) (-0.22) 
NOPENSION 0.070 0.367 0.661 
(0.21) (0.87) (1.14) 
FINPLN 0.040 -0.316 -0.212 
(0.18) ( -1.26) (-0.72) 
HEALTH -0.344 -0.406 -0.483 
( -1.42) ( -1.22) ( -1.34) 
HCOV 1.178*** 0.207 0.192 
(5.63) (0.72) (0.64) 
p75 0.004 0.003 0.004 
(1.59) (0.68) (0.97) 
PBEQUEST 0.031 *** -0.001 -0.001 
(12.43) (0.32) (-0.05) 
HOURS 0.013** 0.020 0.020 
(1.96) (1.16) (1.33) 
AGE 0.036* 0.488* 0.401 
(1.74) (1.90) (1.39) 
DIVORCED 0.265 -0.432 -0.503 
(1.42) (-1.11) ( -1.21) 
WIDOWED -0.465 -0.671 0.661 
( -1.54) (-0.77) (1.14) 
HCHILD -0.013 -0.052 -0.064 





CONS 4.54 *** -15.311 -10.16 
(3.67) ( -1.17) (-0.67) 
no ofobs 1980 1980 1980 
hausman stat for IV regression 50.82** 
Notes: Time/ wave dummies are included in all regressions .. 
* denotes significance at the 10% level; ** at the 5% level, and *** at the 1% level. 
Figures in parentheses are t values. 












OLS FIXED EFFECTS IV FIXED EFFECTS 
IHS(WEALTH) IHS(WEALTH) IHS(WEALTH) 
HP62 -0.002*** 0.001 * -0.004 
(-4.25) (1.71) (-0.58) 
wp62 -0.004*** -0.003*** 0.001 
( -8.14) ( -4.43) (0.11) 
HWGHR 0.001 *** -0.0001 -0.00001 
(5.42) (-0.22) (-0.10) 
WWGHR 0.003*** 0.0001 0.00007 
(5.11) (0.05) (0.11) 
LNOTHERINC 0.009** 0.007 0.007 
(1.99) (1.53) (1.56) 
HPENSION>62 -0.126* -0.085 -0.071 
( -1.77) (-1.26) (-0.92) 
HNOPENSION -0.006 0.051 0.054 
(-0.09) (0.66) (0.62) 
WPENSION>62 0.032 0.053 0.026 
(0.45) (0.74) (0.31) 
WNOPENSION -0.120 0.140* 0.135* 
( -1.66) (1.72) (1.73) 
HFINPLN -0.006 0.090 0.061 
(-0.08) (1.01) (0.57) 
WFINPLN 0.247*** -0.138 -0.138 
(3.43) ( -1.60) ( -1.49) 
HHEALTH -0.452*** -0.132* -0.153* 
(-7.19) (-1.69) (-1.76) 
WHEALTH -0.544*** 0.058 0.071 
(-8.24) (0.67) (0.73) 
HHCOV 0.047 0.041 0.034 
(1.04) (0.65) (0.52) 
WHCOV 0.013 0.005 0.010 
(0.33) (0.10) (0.19) 
HP75 -0.002** -0.001 -0.001 
( -2.16) (-1.37) (-0.34) 
wp75 0.002** -0.0002 -0.001 
(1.98) (-0.23) (-0.39) 
HPBEQUEST 0.011*** 0.0004 0.001 
(21.79) (0.64) (0.70) 
WPBEQUEST 0.010*** 0.0005 0.0004 
(19.66) (0.67) (0.52) 
HAGE 0.047*** -0.0003 -0.0004 
(9.42) (-0.01) ( -0.01) 
WAGE 0.024*** 0.054* 0.051 
(6.29) (1.91) (1.59) 
HCHILD -0.179 -0.463* -0.456* 
( -1.42) (-1.88) (-1.77) 
HHOURS 0.007*** -0.003 -0.003 
(4.33) ( -1.53) ( -1.16) 
WHOURS -0.005*** 0.004 0.003 
( -2.91) (1.60) (0.76) 




















CONS 7.405 *** 
(21.51) 









hausman stat for IV regression 216.77*** 
Notes: Time/ wave dummies are included in all regressions .. 
* denotes significance at the 10% level; ** at the 5% level, and *** at the 1% level. 
Figures in parentheses are t values. 
Table 2.10: Regression Results for Married Couples- Continued 







no of observations 11684 5245 5234 
Table 2.11: Married Couples-More Results 
Single Women Single Men 
PENSION<=62 PENSION>62 PENSION<=62 PENSION>62 
OR NOPENSION OR NOPENSION 
p62 0.005 -0.040* -0.030 -0.025 
(0.06) ( -1.82) (-0.50) ( -0.59) 
no of observations 328 4402 884 1096 
Table 2.12: Effect ofp62 on Wealth- by Pension Status 
Married Men Married Women 
68 
HPENSION<=62 HPENSION>62 WPENSION<=62 WPENSION>62 
OR HNOPENSION OR WNOPENSION 
p62 0.040 -0.016 0.087 -0.011 
(1.18) (-0.90) (0.81) (-0.64) 
no of observations 2508 8400 2161 8652 












2.A Appendix to chapter 2 
p62 Single Women Single men 
WGHR 0.02 0.001 
(1.15) (0.04) 
LNOTHERINC - 0.02 - 0.404 
( -0.11) ( -1.63) 
PENSION>62 4.82* 8.37** 
(1.87) (2.23) 
NOPENSION 3.50 9.36** 
(1.16) (2.12) 
FINPLN 0.30 3.66 
(0.18) (1.39) 
HEALTH -4.99** -3.13 
(-2.35) (-0.90) 
HCOV 5.37** -0.53 
(2.50) (-0.18) 
p75 0.11 *** 0.07* 
(3.94) (1.79) 
PBEQUEST 0.005 0.04 
(0.23) (0.97) 
AGE 3.091 * -2.54 
(1.71) (-0.95) 
DIVORCED 4.81" -2.66 
(1.87) (-0.65) 
WIDOWED 3.500 -15.99" 
(1.16) (-1.75) 
HCHILD - 0.283 - 0.34 
(-0.29) (-0.29) 
HOURS 0.298*"" 0.294""* 
(4.10) (2.75) 
USUALD -100405*** -6.70*** 
(-6.37) ( -2.72) 
CONS -122.67 159.40 
(-1.34) (1.16) 
Time dummies are also included 












wp62/HP62 Married Women Married Men 
HHOURS 0.002 0.13 *** 
(0.05) (3.05) 
WHOURS 0.25 *** 0.03 
(5.57) (0.66) 
HWGHR -0.004* -0.0001 
(-1.77) (-0.03) 
WWGHR -0.003 0.004 
( -0.31) (0.36) 
LNOTHERINC -0.12 0.05 
( -1.50) (0.59) 
HPENSION>62 2.86** 4.69*** 
(2.33) (3.68) 
WPENSION>62 1.30 -3.64 
(0.99) (-2.68) 
HNOPENSION 3.30** 2.77 
(2.31) (1.48) 
WNOPENSION -0.04 -0.69 
(-0.03) (-0.45) 
HFINPLN 3.75** -2.46 
(2.30) ( -1.45) 
WFINPLN 2.92* 1.97 
(1.85) (1.20) 
HHEALTH -1.90 -5.25*** 
( -1.34) (-3.57) 
WHEALTH -3.56** -0.57 
(-2.26) (-0.35) 
HHCOV -0.75 -1.83 
(-0.65) ( -1.53) 
WHCOV -0.46 0.5 
(-0.46) (0.48) 
HP75 -0.07*** 0.07*** 
( -4.40) (4.01) 
wp75 0.08 *** 0.01 
(4.88) (0.67) 
HPBEQUEST -0.02 -0.001 
( -1.63) (-0.03) 
WPBEQUEST 0.01 -0.003 
(1.07) (-0.23) 
HAGE 1.06** 0.75 
(2.09) (1.41) 
WAGE 1.16** 0.36 
(2.24) (0.65) 
HCHILD -6.07 -2.82 
( -1.35) (-0.60) 
HUSUALD -0.58 -6.68*** 
(-0.67) (-4.96) 
WUSUALD -4.08*** -1.84** 
( -4.81) (-2.09) 
CONS -77.06** -9.43 
(-2.22) (-0.26) 
Time Dummies are included 
















Economic decisions typically rely on agents' expectations regarding uncertain events 
in the future. These expectations, in tum, are formed by the agent using his subjective 
beliefs regarding the probability distributions of such vents. In surveys, such subjec-
tive probability distributions are often elicited through the responses agents give to 
questions regarding probabilities of certain events occurring. Concern, however, has 
been expressed in the literature about the pattern of responses given to such questions 
(cf., e.g., Hurd and McGarry, 1995; Hurd et aI., 1998; and Basset and Lumsdaine, 
2001). While general inconsistencies in such answers have been noted, the concen-
tration of answers around focal points (0, 50 and 100 percent)17 has been of notable 
concern. While the bunching of answers at 50 is at worst questionable, it can been 
argued that focal point answers of 0 and 100 are not sensible, in that it is unreason-
able that an agent should know with complete certainty whether an uncertain future 
event will occur or not. Focal point responses are generally distinguished in the liter-












ature from precise answers, implying that these focal point responses are imprecise, 
or inaccurate. 
In this chapter, we use certain dynamic elements of the data to show that there 
are two different kinds of focal point responses given close to the event in question. 
On the one hand, those that are more or less accurate, and, on the other hand, those 
that are not. We show that focal point responses given consistently over the ques-
tioning horizon are quite accurate, whereas focal point responses given only closer to 
the event in question are biased. Thus, what is of interest is the dynamic process that 
leads the agent to form such focal point belief patterns over time. While the literature 
seems to concur that focal point responses of 0 and 100 are a reflection of uncer-
tainty, we provide a formal decision theoretic approach that explains the dynamics of 
the agents' responses. More specifically, we represent a focal point response of 100 
or 0 (or 1,0 on a 0-1 scale) as a neo-additive capacity in the sense of Chateauneuf et 
al. (2007). A neo-additive capacity is a non-additive belief that represents a deviation 
from an additive belief, such that the degree of ambiguity measures the lack of confi-
dence the agent has in some additive probability distribution. Whenever this belief is 
updated over time according to the Generalized Bayesian Update Rule, the degree of 
ambiguity increases, in that the agent has decreasing confidence in the additive prob-
ability distribution. In our context, the agent then resolves this ambiguity by having 
complete confidence in the extreme belief that he/she will, or will not, with absolute 












Our formal interpretation is consistent with focal point responses nearer age 62 
that arise from precise answers given at younger ages. In particular, our interpretation 
is consistent with the data according to which focal point responses given consistently 
over the questioning horizon are quite accurate, whereas focal point responses given 
only closer to the event in question (and that have arisen from precise answers) are 
biased. 
Our contribution in this chapter relates both to the data itself, and in using the 
data to make a theoretical contribution. Firstly, we show that, with the exception of 
married men, the subjective probability of working past age 62 fails to converge to 
the corresponding objective probability as individuals approach age 62. In particu-
lar, there is an upward bias that is non-decreasing over time-an observation which 
represents an apparent violation of the Rational Bayesian Learning paradigm. Sec-
ondly, we show that there is an increased tendency, at older ages to give a focal point 
response of 100 to the question regarding the probability of working full time after 
age 62. More so, we show that it is this phenomenon that is the primary cause ofthe 
failure of the subjective probability of working past age 62 to converge to the cor-
responding objective (additive) probability over time. It is these initial observations 
that lead us to study focal point responses more closely, culminating in our formal 
interpretation of such focal point responses within a decision theoretic framework. 
We proceed as follows. Section 3.2 briefly reviews the existing literature on 












provides the theoretical framework used to explain the observations in the data. In 
section 3.5, we estimate the relevant parameters for the suggested model. Section 3.6 
concludes. 
3.2 The Literature on Focal Point Answers 
Our interpretation of focal point responses as neo-additive capacities stands for a new 
approach to the existing literature on focal point responses. This literature thus far 
tends to agree that focal point answers of 0 and 100 are a reflection of the agent's 
uncertainty regarding the relevant probability distribution. According to Lillard and 
Willis (2001) and Hill et al. (2004), this uncertainty results in agents reporting the 
modal (most likely) probability in response to subjective probability questions. Bas-
set and Lumsdaine (2001) and Huynh and lung (2010) show that individuals who 
give answers of zero and 100 are less educated and have lower income levels than 
other individuals. This suggests that answers of zero and 100 demonstrates low cog-
nition and lack of understanding of the question or concept of a probability. Such 
agents are, in this sense, uncertain as to how to respond. 
The opinion on answers of 50 is different. While Bruine de Bruin et al. (2000) 
say answers of 50 are a reflection of epistemic uncertainty, most other authors say 
answers of 50 reflect genuine probabilities not far from 50 that are simply rounded to 
50 (cf., Borsch-Supan, 1998; Kleinjans and Van Soest, 2010; Huynh and lung, 2010; 












swers of 0 and 100 are related to uncertainty, the probability of giving an answer of 
50 that is not related to a genuine underlying probability is small. Huynh and Jung 
show that while individuals giving answers of zero and 100 are less educated and 
have less income and assets to the rest of the sample, individuals giving answers of 
50 look essentially the same as the rest of the sample (giving more precise proba-
bilities). Manski and Molinari actually ask respondents whether their answers are 
precise probabilities. Of those that said their answers were precise, nearly a quar-
ter gave answers of 50 percent. It thus seems that we should view answers of 50 
differently to answers of 0 and 100. 
Thus, while the literature tends to agree that focal point responses of 0 and 100 
are a reflection of uncertainty, our interpretation provides a mechanism, other than 
the modal choice hypothesis, through which such uncertainty gives rise to these focal 
point responses. 
3.3 Stylized Facts 
3.3.1 Data and Methodology 
We use 7 waves of the Health and retirement study (every two years fromI992-2004) 
to assess how subjective probabilities of working past age 62 deviate from objective 
probabilities. We look at individuals aged 51 to 61. We separate these individuals into 












men. We separate individuals in this manner since we feel that it is likely that gender 
and marital status would influence retirement expectations, and possible that they 
would influence rationality of suchl8 • In order to avoid macroeconomic effects, we 
analyze several cohorts. For each cohort we find the average subjective probability 
at each age. For each age we then find the average subjective probability across all 
cohorts. 
The objective probabilities are calculated by observing the cohorts over time. 
In particular, the objective probability of working full time after age 62 for an indi-
vidual who is, say, 52 in 1992, will be based on what 62 year olds were doing in 
2002. Thus, for this cohort we would include only individuals that are still in the 
sample in 2002 so that we can observe them at age 62. Similarly, the objective prob-
ability for a 52 year old in 2002 will be based on what 62 year olds are expected to 
be doing in 2012. The objective probability for a 52 year old single working male 
in 1992, say, is calculated by looking at the proportion of this group who is working 
full time in 2002 when they are age 62. For a 54 year old individual in 1992, we look 
at the proportion working full time in 2000. This is easily done for ages that are even 
numbers, not so easily done for ages that are odd numbers. For example, a 53 year 
old individual in 1992 was 62 in the year 2001. However, there is no HRS survey in 
18 While it is possible that other factors would influence such, for relative simplicity, we consider 












2001, so we cannot ascertain what this person was doing at age 62. Thus, for the odd 
ages we interpolate (linearly) from the even ages. 19 
In order to calculate the objective probabilities for 62 year olds after 2004, we 
use predicted growth rates of labor force participation rates at age 62, calculated by 
the Bureau of labour statistics, in order to predict the HRS proportions up till 2016. 
Since the growth rates of the proportion of62 year olds working full time in the HRS 
data has greatly followed the growth trends calculated by the BLS for the population 
as a whole, we assume that at the time the HRS was carried out, it would be rational 
to assume that barring any shocks, the growth rates in the HRS proportions would be 
expected to follow the growth trends predicted by the BLS. 
A complication arises from the fact that there is ambiguity in the question " 
What is the probability that you will be working full time after age 621". Does this 
imply after the individual's 62nd birthday, or does it imply after the individual is no 
longer 62? The method used to calculate the objective probability discussed above 
assumes the first i terpretation. However, as noted by Hurd and McGarry (l993b), 
some individuals assume the first interpretation, others the second. We thus also 
calculate the objective probability under the second interpretation. In doing this we 
calculate the proportion of a certain cohort working at time t, that is working full 
19 Except for age 61 where we suspect there might be some discontinuity. For this age we use 
information about what happens at age 63, to infer (by interpolating) what happens at age 62 for this 
age group. We can calculate the objective probability of working at age 63 for 51,53,55,57,59 and 
61 year olds . By looking at the change in this probability between the ages of 59 and 61, we can infer 
the same change for the probability of working full time at age 62. We discuss shortly why we are 












time at age 63. Here of course we have information on the odd ages, and need to 
interpolate for the even ages. 
Our final objective probability for each cohort that we use in our analysis is the 
average of those calculated under the first and second interpretations. Once we have 
calculated the objective probabilities in this way for every age group of every cohort, 
we combine the information to find the average objective probability for every age 
group as a whole. In this way we can track how deviations between subjective and 
objective probabilities change over the years between 51 and 61 for a representative 
agent. Thus, by having seven observations for each age group we can eliminate 
macroeconomic effects, and by looking at cohorts over time we eliminate cohort 
effects. 
Most similar to this approach is that of Hurd et al. (2009)20. They studied 4 
cohorts (of the population as a whole21 ) separately, reaching age 62 in 1996, 1998, 
2000 and 2002 respectively. They compared the average subjective probability of 
the cohort of working after age 62 in previous waves (starting at wave 2) to actual 
outcomes at age 62 (and age 63 to allow for different interpretations of the question). 
They show that individuals tend to overestimate this probability. The disadvantage of 
looking at a particular cohort is that one cannot account for macroeconomic effects 
affecting a specific cohort. However, in looking at the 4 cohorts, while the magnitude 
20 Hurd et al. (2009) specifically analyze the probability of working past age 62, as did Hurd and 
McGarry (1993). Other authors analyzing the rationality of retirement date expectations as a whole 
include Bernheim (1989), Disney and Tanner (1998), Forni (1999), and Benitez-Silva and Dwyer 
(2005), but their approaches are less relevant to our approach in this paper. 












of the overestimation differed, the general tendency to overestimate was present. The 
problem with looking at biases at different ages is that there is only one cohort with 
53-54 year olds, and no cohorts with those younger. A large observed overestimation 
for this age group may have been specific to a macroeconomic effect specific to that 
cohort. 
3.3.2 Results 
Looking at figure 3.1, we find that, with the exception of married men whose subjec-
tive probabilities seem to correspond to the objective probabilities, all other groups 
tend to overestimate the probability of working full time after age 62. The effect 
seems most pronounced for single women, and least pronounced for married women. 
More so, for all groups, the SUbjective probabilities do not seem to converge to the ob-
jective probabilities over time, with the average deviation remaining approximately 
constant between the ages of 51 and 61. This is in contrast to what would be predicted 
by the theory of Rational Bayesian Learning. 
In order to try and ascertain the cause of this phenomenon, we look at the 
distribution of subjective probabilities at different ages for our different subgroups. 
Figures 3.2 and 3.3 display these distributions. There are a two important observa-
tions. Firstly, there is a definite bunching of responses at 0, 50 and 100 percent for 
all of our four subgroups at both younger and older ages. Secondly, while the pro-












older ages, the proportion of responses at 100 increases for all our four groups as in-
dividuals get closer to age 62. This leads us to the question-Are these increasing 
number of responses at 100 responsible for the lack of convergence of the subjective 
probabilities to the objective probabilities as individuals approach age 62? In order 
to answer this question, we omit all observations with extreme focal point responses 
(0 and 100). We only omit focal values of 0 and 100, not 50, since there is enough 
evidence in the literature to suggest that it is individuals giving answers of 0 and 100, 
specifically, that demonstrate different attributes and greater uncertainty than the rest 
of the sample. The literature is generally more concerned about answers of 0 and 
100, than about answers of 50. We then carry out the same methodology outlined 
above for this sample. In addition to recalculating average subjective probabilities 
for this group, we recalculate objective probabilities for this group. We do this since 
the literature has stressed the fact that individuals providing these focal point answers 
have different attributes (such as being less educated and having lower assets) to the 
rest of the population. Since these attributes are correlated with retirement timing, it 
is likely that the objective probability of working past age 62 is also different to the 
rest of the population. Thus, the objective probability of working past age 62 is likely 
to be different in the sample excluding focal point responses to a sample including 












Figure 3.1: Suhjective and Objective Probabilities 
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Figure 3.3: Distribution of p62 between the ages of 56 and 6! inclusive 
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3.3.3 Results without Focal Point Answers 
Figure 3.4 shows the relevant subjective and objective probabilities for this sample. 
A different picture emerges. There is definitely evidence that this sample of individu-
als are rational Bayesian learners. This is especially the case with single men, single 
women and married men, where by age 61, the subjective probability almost com-
pletely coincides with the objective probability. In the case of married women, we 
do notice a degree of convergence, albeit not complete. This convergence is the case, 
despite the fact that such individuals start off far less accurate than the those in the 
sample including focal point respondents. What is important in the rational Bayesian 
learning paradigm, is not the size of the initial bias, but rather the fact that the bias 
decreases over time. 
As a whole, it seems that individuals giving precise answers (including answers 
at 50) tend to subscribe to the rational Bayesian learning paradigm, while the popula-
tion as a whole (including those giving focal point answers of 0 and 100) does noe2 • 
More so, it is apparent that the presence of focal point responses results in greater 
accuracy at younger ages (the upward bias is smaller at younger ages in the entire 
sample than in that minus focal points), but induces an upward bias at older ages. 
Thus, we are interested in the nature of focal point responses given nearer to age 62. 












Figure 3.4: No Focal Point Responses 
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throughout the questioning horizon. We see that as age 62 approaches, the focal 
point answer of 100 now becomes relatively accurate. 
Figure 3.7 shows individuals who give focal point responses of zero that arise 
from precise responses. Here we notice an increasing downward bias as age 62 
approaches. Figure 3.8 shows individuals who give a focal point response of zero 
consistently throughout the questioning horizon. These individuals are remarkably 
accurate from the outset. Even at younger ages, the objective probability is equal to, 
or very close to zero. 
It is clear that it is focal point responses that arise from precise responses that 
induce a bias at ages closer to 62. However, with the exception of married men, 
since the proportion of zeros that arise from precise responses is small relative to the 
proportion of 100's that arise from precise answers2\ we observe an upward bias as 
age 62 approaches. In the case of married men, it is the fact that these proportions 
are essentially equal, that the upward and downward biases cancel, and that they thus 
appear "rational" at this point. 
In the next section, we provide a theoretical framework that can explain the 
mechanism whereby bias is created as precise responses become focal points. 












focal Response Single Women Single Men -"larried \Vom~n \larri ed Men 
100 " 32 60 36 10 - i];; 35 0 25
Table 3.1: Percentage of End Point Focal Point Responses Arising from Precise Re-
sponses 
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Figure 3.7: Zero from Precise 
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3.4 Theoretical Framework 
We assume that subjective probabilities are non-additive beliefs. Non-additive beliefs 
account for individuals exhibiting ambiguity attitudes in the sense of Schmeidler 
(1989). Individuals displaying such non-additive beliefs can be described as Choquet 
Expected Utility (CEU) decision makers, in that they maximize utility with respect to 
non-additive beliefs. In particular, the non-additive belief is a neo-additive capacity 
in the sense of Chateauneuf et al. (2007). 
Definition 1 For a given measurable space (S, ~, v), the neo-additive capacity, v, 
is given by 
v(E) = 8· (A· wO(E) + (1 - A) . w1(E)) + (1 - 8) . J.L(E) (3.1) 
for all E E~, where 8E[0, 1] (degree of ambiguity) measures the lack of confi-
dence the decision maker has in some subjective additive probability distribution, 
J.L, and AE [0, 1] measures the weight the decision maker gives to the belief wO (E) 
in the face of ambiguity25 . 
Now 
and 
wO(E) = { 100 ifE# 0 
o ifE=0 (3.2) 
25 In general, the literature terms .x, the degree of optimism. In our context, however, we do not use 
the terminologies, optimism and pessimism, since, while some individuals might consider working 












1 { a ifE# S 
w (E) = 100 ifE=S (3.3) 
Let us write the event that the agent works past age 62 as W62. If W62 is always 
possible, then wO(E) = 100.26If it is also possible not to work past age 62, then 
Wi (E) = O. The neo-additive capacity then reduces to 
v(62) = 100· (8· A) + (1 - 8) . jt(62) (3.4) 
Now, the greater is A, the more weight will be given to the belief WO (W62) = 
100, for a given level of ambiguity. If A = 0, no weight is given to the belief 
WO( W62) = 100. In other words, the greater is A, the more weight will be placed 
on the belief that the agent will, with absolute certainty, work past age 62. If A=l, a 
weight of 8 will be placed on the belief that the agent will, with absolute certainty, 
work past age 62. If A =0, a weight of 8 will be placed on the beliefthat an agent will 
with absolute certainty, not work past age 62. In both instances, a weight (1 - 8) will 
be placed on the additive probability, jt(62), as it is perceived by the agent. At the 
same time, as the level of ambiguity, 8, increases for a given level of A, less weight is 
placed on the additive probability, jt(62). If 8 = 0, the capacity reduces to the additive 
probability, and the agent is "rational". If A = 1,the neo-additive capacity displays 
an upward bias from the additive probability, while if A = 0, it displays a downward 
bias. 
26 Note that we use a scale of 0 to 100, since this is the scale used in the data. A belief wO (E) = 100 












Now using the notation of Ludwig and Zimper (2008), let 1f j,62 denote the true 
probability of an agent of age j working past age 62. The agent's subjective belief 
about this probability is denoted Kj,62. His estimator about 1fj,62 is then the choquet 
expected value of Kj,62 (referred to from now simply as K) with respect to the neo-
additive capacity v. 
E[K,v] = 100· (8· A) + (1- 8)· E(K,J1) (3.5) 
where 
E(~ ) A,62-j 1f j,62, J1 = 'fJ • 1f j,62 (3.6) 
We can interpret a focal point answer of 100, as a neo-additive capacity in the 
extreme case where A = 1, and 8 = 1, and a focal point answer of 0, as a neo-additive 
capacity with A = 0, and 8 = 1. 
How do we account for precise responses becoming focal point responses as 
age 62 approaches? Gilboa and Schmeidler (1993) and Eichberger et al. (2006) 
present various update rules for non-additive measures. Applying The Generalized 
Bayesian Update Rule to our neo-additive capacity, we have, 
E[K, v(·lh)] = 100· (8h . A) + (1 - 8h ) . E[K, J1(·lh)] (3.7) 
such that 
(3.8) 















j + h) 
E[7r, /L(·lh)] = 2 + h . 1rj,62 (3.10) 
where E[7r, v('lh)] represents the agent's posterior beliefthat he will work full 
time after age 62 given the information he has after h years experience. Following 
Ludwig and Zimper, we assume that Ih is more specifically represented by I~(h)' That 
is, we assume that after h years experience, the agent observes that k out of n people 
have worked past age 62. We assume for simplicity that the agent starts learning 
at age 51, such that age 51 corresponds to h = 1. Further, following Ludwig and 
Zimper (2008), we assume, /L(h) = C~h)' The proof of this can be seen in that 
paper. Proof of equation 3.8 is derived by Ludwig and Zimper (2008,2009), and is 
replicated in the appendix to this chapter. 
It should be clear that 8h > 8, so that 8h > 8h- 1• Thus, as time goes on, 
and the agent gathers more and more information, 8 ~ 1, such that the capacities of 
individuals with A = 1 tend to 100. Thus, individuals in our sample who have A = 1 
will be inclined to give focal point answer of 100 as time goes on27 • Similarly, the 
capacities of individuals with A = 0 tend to O. Thus, individuals in our sample who 
have A = 0 will be inclined to give focal point answer of 0 as time goes on. 
However, we have noted that in the sample of individuals who only ever give 
precise responses, as well as those giving an answer of 100 consistently, there is gen-
erally convergence of the subjective probability to the objective probability. In the 













sample of individuals giving an answer of zero consistently, the subjective and ob-
jective measures coincide from the outset. It is, thus, likely that the subjective proba-
bilities of these groups are additive measures. We have rational Bayesian learning as 
individuals' perception of the additive probability, 7rj,62, converges to the true addi-
tive probability, 7rj,62, with increasing information and experience. That is, if & = 0, 
then after h years experience 
_ (2rjJ62- j + h) 
E[7r, v(·lhl = 2 + h ·7rj,62 (3.11) 
As a whole the population tends to behave like the representative agent dis-
cussed in Ludwig and Zimper (2008). This agent displays rational Bayesian learning, 
together with increasing psychological bias as time goes on. 
3.5 Estimating Parameters for the model 
We now estimate parameters for the model/s proposed above. We estimate the pa-
rameters based on the average subjective probabilities in each age group- that is, 
we attempt to fit the curves in the various diagrams above. We estimate parameters 
for three different samples. First, we estimate the parameters of a rational Bayesian 
learning model for the sample of individuals not giving focal point responses. We 
then estimate a "rational Bayesian learning, with psychological bias" model for in-
dividuals who give focal point responses that arise from precise responses. Lastly, 












sample representative of the population as a whole. We use non-linear regression 
analysis, trying different starting values to make sure we have unique convergence. 
Table 3.2 presents our estimates of ¢ for our sample of Bayesian learners, while 
figure 3.9, diagrammatically shows the actual and predicted values of the subjective 
probabilities. In all instances we have an initial overestimation (¢ > 1), with the fit 
of the model being very good-Note the high R2 values, as well as the fitted curves 
in figure 3.9. Table 3.3 presents our estimates for the sample of individuals who give 
focal point responses of 100 that arise from precise responses. We restrict A to be 
equal to 1 and estimate 8 and ¢. Here we have an initial underestimation in all cases 
-2 
(¢ < 1). The R values, as well as the fitted curves in figure 3.10 show a very good 
fit. In Table 3.4 we show our estimates of ¢ and 8 for the sample of individuals who 
give focal point responses of zero that arise from precise answers. Here we restrict A 
to be equal to zero. We have an initial overestimation. The R2 values and figure 3.11 
show that the fit is better for men than for women. In figures 3.12 and 3.13, we show 
the path of the estimated 8 for these focal point responses that arise from precise 
responses. Finally, in Table 3.5 we estimate ¢, 8, and A for the sample representative 
-2 












SINGLE WOMEN SINGLE MEN MARRIED WOMEN MARRIED MEN 
1> 1.06 1.06 1.12 1.01 
(278) (294) (73.15) (376) 
Ii:! 0.99 0.99 0.92 0.99 
Table 3.2: Parameter Estimates-Bayesian Learning 
SINGLE WOMEN SINGLE MEN MARRIED WOMEN MARRIED MEN 
¢ 0.66 0.31 0.94 0.94 
(7.72) (0.61) (32.49) (35.10) 
8 0.2 0.33 0.28 0.3 
(2.49) (11.08) (3.44) (1.49) 
Ii./. 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.93 
Table 3.3: Parameter Estimates- 100 Arising from Precise 
SINGLE WOMEN SINGLE MEN MARRIED WOMEN MARRIED MEN 
1> 1.22 1.23 1.22 1.17 
(32.87) (29.72) (16.48) (43.84) 
8 0.2 0.30 0.3 0.2 
(1.9) (2.91) (2.47) (3.31) 
Ii~ 0.64 0.92 0.73 0.90 
Table 3.4: Parameter Estimates- Zero Arising from Precise 
SINGLE WOMEN SINGLE MEN MARRIED WOMEN MARRIED MEN 
¢ 1.02 0.38 0.362 0.28 
(205) (0.8) (0.5) (0.5) 
8 0.03 0.67 0.69 0.72 
(0.9) (6.03) (5.12) (8.29) 
>. 0.88 0.56 0.48 0.57 
(1.98) (18.47) (16.05) (28) 
Ii"' 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 
Table 3.5: Parameter Estimates- Whole Population 












Figure 3.9: Fitted Values-No Foca l Points 
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Figure 3. 11: Fitted Values -Zero from Precise 
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Figure 3.12: Degree of Ambigu ity: 100 Aris ing from P~ise 
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Figure 3. 14 : Filled Values -\Vho!e Population 
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The aim of this chapter is to show that our formal interpretation of focal point answers 
as neo-additive capacities is consistent with the features of the data. In fact, the fit of 
the data to our model is very good. 
Focal point responses of 100 or 0 closer to age 62, that arise from precise re-
sponses, are biased upwards and downwards respectively. In particular, a focal point 
response of 100 or 0, that arises from a precise response, can be represented by a 
neo-additive capacity. A neo-additive capacity is a non-additive belief that represents 
a deviation from an additive belief, such that the degree of ambiguity measures the 
lack of confidence the agent has in some additive probability distribution. As this 
belief is updated over time according to the Generalized Bayesian Update Rule, the 
degree of ambiguity increases, in that the agent has decreasing confidence in the ad-
ditive probability distribution. In our context, the agent then resolves this ambiguity 
by having complete confidence in the extreme belief that he/she will, or will not, with 
absolute certainty, continue to work full time after age 62. On the contrary, individ-
uals who consistently give precise responses, or, who consistently give focal point 
responses over the questioning horizon, are rational, in the sense that their subjective 
probabilities coincide with the objective probabilities, at least by the time they are 
close to age 62. These responses can be represented by additive probabilities. 
This, together with the observation that, with the exception of married men, the 












of 100's that arise from precise answers, explains the persistence of the upward bias 
in the sample of the population as a whole, even as age 62 approaches. 
As a final point, we note that while it appeared at the outset that married men 
were more rational than other individuals, after decomposing the data further we 
see that this is not the case. While heterogeneity in gender and marital status might 
influence the level of retirement expectations, it does not influence the rationality of 
such. The absence of an upward bias in the subjective probability of working past 
age 62 close to age 62 for married men, is not due to them being more rational, but 
rather due to the positive and negative biases of focal points of 100 and 0 respectively 













3.A Appendix to Chapter 3 
Let the event E be such that the agent works full time after age 62. Applying the 
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Concluding Remarks and Outlook 
In the context of the life-cycle theory of consumption and saving, the most im-
portant parameter governing an individual's saving decision is the expected length of 
his retirement horizon. This, in tum, is governed by both his expected longevity, and 
his expected date of retirement. The focus of this thesis has been on theoretical and 
empirical questions concerning the expected date of retirement. In the wake of the 
aging of the baby boomers and greater longevity in general, governments are desper-
ately attempting to keep their public pension funds solvent by instituting policies to 
increase average retirement ages. As we argue in Chapter 1, however, these govern-
ments need to be aware of the adverse effects these policies have on private savings 
behavior. In fact, due to the tendency for retirement date expectations to be biased up-
wards, the population is likely to overreact to such policies. In an attempt to avert a 
pension crisis, governments might be, inadvertently, exacerbating the savings crisis. 
From a theoretical perspective, we show that later retirement dates should in-
duce younger individuals to save less, whereby this relative effect is greater when 
preferences are non-separable in consumption and leisure, and in particular, when the 
cross-derivative of the utility function is negative. From an empirical perspective, the 
point estimates suggest that the responsiveness of Americans' saving decisions to re-
tirement date expectations is large. A ten percentage point increase in the household 












in household wealth well in excess of 20%. At the same time, we know that greater 
longevity should induce younger individuals to save more in the face of a longer ex-
pected retirement horizon. However, the Bloom et al (2007) study showed that only 
couples respond to survival expectations when making saving decisions. In contrast, 
single individuals seem unresponsive to such survival expectations in their wealth ac-
cumulation decisions. Our study provides a stronger result. Our regressions in Chapter 
2 show that when retirement expectations are controlled for, neither single nor married 
couples seem to respond to survival expectations in wealth accumulation decisions. 
In light of this, individuals responding to later expected retirement dates, but not to 
their increased longevity, are likely to save far less over the life-cycle than predicted 
by standard models of consumption smoothing. That is, individuals are likely to reach 
retirement with inadequate savings, to the extent that they are forced to drop their con-
sumption levels at this point. 
In addition, Chapter 3 demonstrates that retirement date expectations are biased 
upwards, that is, individuals expect to work longer than they actually do. This, cou-
pled with the empirical fact that survival probabilities are biased downwards at pre-
retirement ages (cf., Ludwig and Zimper, 2008), implies that individuals are grossly 
underestimating their retirement horizons. Of course, this once again implies that in-












of the population for which the upward bias in the probability of working past age 62 
gets larger and larger as age 62 approaches. These are individuals who give focal point 
answers of 100 close to age 62, but precise responses at younger ages. Such individ-
uals are likely to exhibit dynamically inconsistent saving behavior, in the sense that 
they perceive an increasingly lesser need to save as retirement approaches. An inter-
esting avenue for future research would be to follow the consumption! saving behavior 
of such individuals over the panel in order to empirically verify the existence of such 
dynamically inconsistent saving behavior. It would also be interesting to observe how 
these individuals react when they reach retirement. Do they experience a greater drop 
in consumption at this point than do "rational" individuals? 
In concluding this thesis, we take note of three caveats. Firstly, we need to ac-
knowledge that we are not analyzing aggregate saving. Aggregate saving is determined 
by the aggregation of the saving of the young and the dissaving of the old. In addition 
to the behavioral effects of individual saving behavior addressed in this thesis, there is 
a compositional element at the aggregate level which is induced by a change in retire-
ment dates. That is, with later retirement dates there is an increase in the percentage of 
the working popUlation relative to the non-working population. This compositional ef-
fect implies that there is also a greater percentage of savers. Thus, while the aim of this 












we also need to be aware that at the aggregate level there is a positive compositional 
effect in addition to this negative behavioral effect. 
However, to the extent that the later retirement date remains an expectation, there 
is a behavioral effect that has not yet translated into a compositional effect. Policies 
to raise the retirement age are implemented gradually, with retirees at the time of the 
passing of the laws not being effected at all. While current US retirees are now retir-
ing later than did their older counterparts a few years back, younger Americans can 
expect to retire even later than those retiring today. In some other OEeD countries, 
individuals of retirement age are yet to experience the effect of such policies. In ad-
dition, there is talk to raise the Normal Retirement Age even further. Thus, to a large 
degree, these later retirement dates are still to come into effect and have not yet trans-
lated into a compositional effect. It is the expectation of later retirement that induces 
a negative behavioral effect on saving, and there is no doubt that such expectation is 
certainly present. 
Preliminary research (cf., Romm and Wolny, 2010), looking at the effect of later 
retirement on aggregate savings, suggests that even once later retirement has come into 
effect, the behavioral effect dominates the compositional effect. By looking at coun-
tries where average retirement ages have already started rising, we establish a negative 
causal relationship between later retirement ages and aggregate savings, suggesting a 












between those countries where there is an expectation that the retirement age will in-
crease further, and those where there is less of an expectation. This would allow us to 
compare the relative strengths of the behavioral effect in these different cases. 
As a second caveat, we acknowledge that within the Choquet Expected Utility 
paradigm, biases in expectations are usually thought about in terms of optimism and 
pessimism. In this thesis, however, we deliberately omit this terminology, since it is 
our view that whether retiring later is considered a good or bad event, is a matter of 
preference. In future research we plan to look more closely at the characteristics of 
those individuals giving focal point responses of 100 and zero close to retirement, 
in an attempt to ascertain which of these individuals are displaying optimism, and 
which, pessimism. For example, are individuals giving focal point responses of zero 
close to retirement in bad health, or, do they simply perceive themselves to be very 
wealthy? While, in the first instance such individuals would be displaying pessimism, 
in the second instance they would be displaying optimism. In addition, it would be 
interesting to address the question as to whether the propensity to give a focal point 
response in this domain, translates into a propensity to give focal point responses in 
other domains. That is, do individuals have a general tendency to be optimistic or 
pessimistic, or is such psychological bias restricted to a particular issue, or perhaps 
to a few related issues? For Example, do individuals who give a zero response to 












response to the question regarding the probability of living till age 75? Do they give 
focal point responses to all subjective probability questions? 
As a final caveat, we note that preferences for retirement are likely to be a cul-
tural issue that differs between countries. For example, various estimates for the US 
suggest that--on average- individuals display a preference for leisure. Laitner and 
Silverman (2005), and Mazzocco (2005) show that leisure is more heavily weighted in 
individuals' utility functions than consumption, with Mazzocco showing this weight-
ing to be higher for females than males. Van Soest et al (2006), and Vaiikova and 
Van Soest (2009) use stated preferences data to analyze preferences for retirement in 
The Netherlands. While preferences for different retirement trajectories are analyzed, 
in general it seems that the Dutch do not display a preference for later retirement. 
Further, Van Soest et al (2006) show that while better educated individuals prefer rela-
tively later retirement, women and those in poor health display a preference for earlier 
retirement. Vaiikova and Van Soest (2009) recommend that later retirement be encour-
aged by providing financial incentives for phased retirement. Esser (2006) analyzes 
preferred retirement dates for twelve European countries. In all cases, preferred re-
tirement dates are lower than both expected retirement dates, and statutory retirement 
dates. Furthermore, in the UK, Ireland, Italy, France and Belgium, the preference for 
earlier retirement is greater than in Germany, Sweden and Finland, with latest retire-












in national retirement preferences is vital in implementing appropriate policies aimed 
at increasing average retirement ages, whereby such policies should be fine-tuned to 
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Trends in Labor Force Participation Rates 
of Older Workers in the US 
Data from the Current Population Survey (CPS) show labor force participation 
rates of men aged 62 and above, having trended downward for a large part of the 
1900's, reaching a low in 1985, leveling out till about 1996, after which time they 
started trending upwards. In fact, for men in the age group between 65 and 69 labour 
force participation rates had reached levels of about 33% in March 2008, after having 
been at a low of 24% in 1985 and 27% in 1995. This rate is projected by the Bureau 
of Labor Statistics (BLS) to reach 40% by 2016. The incrcas~ :u participation rates 
have also been noticeable for men in the 62 to 64 age group, rising from 43% in 1995 
to 52% in March 2008. The projection for 2016 is 58%. While participation rates 
for older women did not follow the same downward trend as men before 1985 (due to 
the overall increase in participation rates for women), these rates have definitely been 
trending upwards since about 1995. In the 65 to 69 age group, labor force participation 
rates for women were 27% in 2008, compared to 17% in 1995 and is projected by the 
BLS to reach 31 % by 2016. The participation rate was 41 % in 2008 compared to 32% 
in 1995 for women in the age group 62 to 64, and is projected to reach 48% by 2016 
(BLS). 
There has also been an increase in older workers working full time. In 2008, 












This rose from 57% in 1995 to 72% in 2008 for men in the age group 65 to 69. Of 
women employed in the age group 62 to 64, 65% were full time in 2008, as against 
60% in 1995. For women in the age group 65 to 69, this figure rose from 43% in 1995 













A Brief Overview of the Structure of the 
Social Security Retirement System in the 
US 
While Social Security incentives governing retirement decisions are often com-
plex and difficult to understand, our aim here is to provide a very brief account. 
96 percent of American workers are covered by social security. Benefits are 
calculated based on lifetime earnings, with the 35 years of highest earnings being 
taken into consideration. If there were years when one did not work, or earned less, 
benefits will be lower than they would be had one worked steadily. 
The Normal retirement age, or the age at which one can receive full benefits, is 
age 65 for those born before 1938, and increases by two months for those born every 
year thereafter. The Normal retirement age is 67 for those born in 1960 or thereafter. 
The earliest age at which one can receive benefits is age 62, but retiring before the 
normal retirement age means that benefits are permanently reduced. In fact, people 
retiring at age 62, will have benefits that are about 25%-30% less, than had they waited 
till normal retirement age to retire. 
It is also possible to delay retirement past the Normal Retirement age. Social 
security benefits will increase in two ways. First, a higher level of lifetime earnings 
increases benefits. Secondly, there is an automatic increase in benefits if one works 












which one is born, and in particular, is 8% per year for those born in 1943 or thereafter. 
While a certain amount of research has debated the actuarial fairness of postponing 
retirement past the Normal Retirement age for those born before 1943, there is no 
question that retiring before the Normal Retirement age results in a permanent loss in 
benefits. Since, the question which we are concerned with in this research is that of 
working past the early retirement age of 62, it is this particular incentive that concerns 
us. 
